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THE PICK-AND-SHOVEL PLAY: BIOETHICS
FOR GENE-EDITING VECTOR PATENTS*
JACOB S. SHERKOW** & CHRISTOPHER THOMAS SCOTT***
Concerns over patent protection covering new forms of gene
editing have largely focused on the intellectual property covering
the editing mechanism itself, most notably CRISPR (clustered
regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats), but also ZFNs
(zinc finger nucleases) and TALENs (transcription activator-like
effector nucleases). Some of the most important technical
advances in these areas, however, relate not to these technologies
themselves but to vectors—the means for introducing the geneediting machinery into human cells. In this Article, we discuss the
implications of one intellectual property strategy used by some
commercial developers of gene-editing vectors: a divided strategy
of keeping some of the most significant information about vectors
secret while patenting, cryptically, other aspects. We liken this to
the business strategy of a “pick-and-shovel play”: using secrecy as
informational arbitrage to sell gene editing’s necessary equipment.
Such a strategy raises specific ethical and safety issues pertaining
to many gene therapy interventions—namely, the uncertainty of
risk, a reliance on insufficient preclinical evidence, the detriment
of patient-physician decisionmaking, and increases in monetary
costs. At the same time, these bioethical issues seem to illuminate
the importance of patents’ disclosure function to, perhaps
surprisingly, consumers, users, and standards developers.

* © 2019 Jacob S. Sherkow & Christopher Thomas Scott.
** Professor of Law, Innovation Center for Law and Technology, New York Law
School; Adjunct Assistant Professor, Columbia University Mailman School of Public
Health; Permanent Visiting Professor, Center for Advanced Studies in Biomedical
Innovation Law, University of Copenhagen.
*** Dalton Tomlin Professor of Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Associate Director
of Health Policy, Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Baylor College of Medicine.
Thanks to Jorge L. Contreras, Shubha Ghosh, Dmitry Karshtedt, Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, and W. Nicholson Price II, and to participants of the University of Crete
Department of Economics TECHNIS Seminar, the University of Utah Law and Bioscience
Colloquium, and the Stanford Center for Law and the Bioscience’s Biolawlapalooza for
their superb comments. The authors would also like to thank Brian Champion and Zan Eric
Newkirk for their excellent shovel work, Henry Zaytoun and the editorial staff, and the
organizers and faculty overseeing this issue of the North Carolina Law Review’s annual
symposium. JSS was also supported by the New York Law School Summer Research Fund.

97 N.C. L. REV. 1497 (2019)

1498

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 1498
I.
GENE EDITING, VECTORS, AND IP ................................. 1508
A. Gene-Editing Technologies ........................................ 1508
B. Invention, Disclosure, and the Gene-Editing Patent
Estate ............................................................................ 1510
C. The Importance of Vectors......................................... 1513
D. Gene-Editing Vectors and Safety............................... 1515
II.
THE GENE-EDITING VECTOR PICK-AND-SHOVEL
PLAY .................................................................................... 1522
A. Secrecy in Pick-and-Shovel Plays ............................. 1522
B. The Pick-and-Shovel Play, Gene-Editing Vectors, and
Patents .......................................................................... 1524
III. BIOETHICS OF VECTOR PICK-AND-SHOVEL PLAYS ..... 1530
A. Uncertain Risk ............................................................. 1531
B. Insufficient Preclinical Evidence ............................... 1534
C. Opacity to Informed Consent .................................... 1538
D. Increased Costs ............................................................ 1540
IV. PICKS, SHOVELS, AND PATENT DISCLOSURE................ 1543
A. Expanded Audiences for Patent Disclosure ............. 1544
B. Informing the Costs of Inventing Around ................ 1547
C. Channeling Therapies and Platform
Standardization ........................................................... 1549
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 1551
INTRODUCTION
Huck Finn, did you ever hear of a prisoner having picks and
shovels, and all the modern conveniences in his wardrobe to dig
himself out with? Now I want to ask you—if you got any
reasonableness in you at all—what kind of a show would that give
him to be a hero? Why, they might as well lend him the key, and
done with it. Picks and shovels—why, they wouldn’t furnish ‘em
to a king.
—Mark Twain, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn1
Much has been made about recent developments in genomeediting technologies such as CRISPR that, depending upon one’s

1. MARK TWAIN, ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN (TOM SAWYER’S
COMRADE) 306 (Collectors Reprints Inc. 1991) (1885).
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perspective, promise both the salvation and destruction of humankind.2
But perhaps an equal amount of commentary on the technologies has
been reserved for the patent estates covering them. Bioethicists, legal
scholars, and the popular press have dissected, analyzed, and critiqued
the genome-editing patent landscape in minute detail across a wide
variety of publications that rival the number of papers describing uses
of the technologies themselves.3 A substantial reason for this interest
lies in the amount of money involved in patent licensing and litigation
in this area: patent licenses for gene-editing technologies routinely
command tens of millions of dollars that, in total, are likely worth many
billions.4 The four principal companies, all publicly traded, that are
today closest to delivering a genome-editing product are collectively

2. Compare, e.g., Giedrius Gasiunas & Virginijus Siksnys, RNA-Dependent DNA
Endonuclease Cas9 of the CRISPR System: Holy Grail of Genome Editing?, 21 TRENDS
MICROBIOLOGY 562, 562 (2013) (“Targeted genome editing technology that enables the
generation of site-specific changes in the genomic DNA of cellular organisms is a Holy Grail
for genome engineers.”), with Sheila Jasanoff, J. Benjamin Hurlbut & Krishanu Saha,
CRISPR Democracy: Gene Editing and the Need for Inclusive Deliberation, 32 ISSUES SCI.
& TECH., Fall 2015, http://issues.org/32-1/crispr-democracy-gene-editing-and-the-need-forinclusive-deliberation/ [https://perma.cc/WKN4-KRWM] (“CRISPR raises basic questions
about the rightful place of science in governing the future in democratic societies.”).
CRISPR is an acronym for “clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats.”
Francisco J.M. Mojica et al., Intervening Sequences of Regularly Spaced Prokaryotic Repeats
Derive from Foreign Genetic Elements, 60 J. MOLECULAR EVOLUTION 174, 174 (2005).
3. See, e.g., Knut J. Egelie et al., The Emerging Patent Landscape of CRISPR–Cas
Gene Editing Technology, 34 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1025, 1025 (2016) (discussing
some ethical issues with the CRISPR patent landscape); Jacob S. Sherkow, The CRISPR
Patent Landscape: Past, Present, and Future, 1 CRISPR J. 1, 3–4 (2018) [hereinafter
Sherkow, CRISPR Patent Landscape] (opining on the future of the CRISPR patent
landscape); see also Sharon Begley, As CRISPR Patent Fight Nears the Endgame, Where Are
Settlement Talks?, STAT (May 2, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/05/02/crispr-patentfight-settlement-talks/ [https://perma.cc/3VB3-HDQK (dark archive)] (reporting on the
global CRISPR patent landscape).
4. See Caroline Chen & Doni Bloomfield, Gene-Editing Tool on Every Drugmaker’s
2016 Wish List, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 24, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-12-24/the-gene-editing-tool-on-every-drugmaker-s-wish-list-this-year [https://perma.cc/
U8EP-5CDS (dark archive)] (reporting on value of license payments); Jacob S. Sherkow,
How Much Is a CRISPR Patent License Worth?, FORBES (Feb. 21, 2017, 5:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsherkow/2017/02/21/how-much-is-a-crispr-patent-licenseworth/#786147e6b777 [https://perma.cc/38QL-EWY4] (estimating the value of a CRISPR
patent license).
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worth roughly $5.5 billion.5 With no sense of understatement, genomeediting intellectual property has been described as a new “gold rush.”6
But as the adage goes, the best business to be in during a gold rush
isn’t mining but selling picks and shovels.7 The same may ultimately be
true for gene-editing intellectual property: the best bet may be
licensing patents that make gene editing possible.8 In particular, geneediting technologies rely on critically important pieces of necessary
equipment—vectors—that catalyze the introduction of the editing

5. As of the end of trading on May 8, 2019, Sangamo Therapeutics, Inc. had a market
cap of $1.31 billion, Stock Quote: Sangamo Therapeutics, Inc., BLOOMBERG,
https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/SGMO:US [https://perma.cc/L9CF-M9CN (dark archive)]
(last updated May 8, 2019), Editas Medicine, Inc., $1.24 billion, Stock Quote: Editas
Medicine, Inc., BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/EDIT:US [https://perma.cc/
3YBY-3GPH (dark archive)] (last updated May 8, 2019), CRISPR Therapeutics AG, $2.11
billion, Stock Quote: CRISPR Therapeutics AG, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/
quote/CRSP:US [https://perma.cc/WC46-Y92A (dark archive)] (last updated May 8, 2019),
and Intellia Therapeutics Inc., $751 million, Stock Quote: Intellia Therapeutics, Inc.,
BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/NTLA:US [https://perma.cc/UR7E-M2XN
(dark archive)] (last updated May 8, 2019).
6. Deborah Netburn, UC Berkeley Suffers Big Loss in CRISPR Patent Fight: What’s
Next for the Powerful Gene-Editing Technology?, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2017, 8:00 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-crispr-patent-decision-20170215-story.html
[https://perma.cc/3TNH-4SGY (staff-uploaded archive)] (“CRISPR is a gold mine, and
that’s why you are seeing a gold rush.”).
7. G. Thomas Goodnight & Sandy Green, Rhetoric, Risk, and Markets: The Dot-Com
Bubble, 96 Q.J. SPEECH 115, 125 (2010) (“The [new] gold rush is following the classic
pattern. It is not the diggers themselves who make the first money, but the manufacturers
of picks and shovels.’’); Elicia Maine, Sarah Lubik & Elizabeth Garnsey, Process-Based vs.
Product-Based Innovation: Value Creation by Nanotech Ventures, 32 TECHNOVATION 179,
184 (2012) (describing fuel cell test equipment as a “‘pick and shovel’ niche strategy”);
Christine Williamson, Cryptocurrency Concerns Keeping Investors at Bay, 45 PENSIONS &
INV. 4, 6 (2017) (“As the old adage goes: In a gold rush, money is made by selling picks and
shovels.”); Julia Fortier, There’s More than One Way to Make It in Biotech, BOS. GLOBE,
Sept. 3, 1985, at B39 (“But hitting the pay dirt is still years in the future for most biotech
companies. In the meantime, just as in the 1849 California Gold Rush, it’s the ‘picks and
shovels’ people who are quietly raking in sales.”).
8. See Claudia Carbone et al., Lipid-Based Nanocarriers for Drug Delivery and
Targeting: A Patent Survey of Methods of Production and Characterization, 2
PHARMACEUTICAL PAT. ANALYST 665, 667–75 (2013) (analyzing patents covering lipidbased nanocarriers); Virgínia Picanço-Castro, Elisa Maria de Sousa Russo-Carbolante &
Dimas Tadeu Covas, Advances in Lentiviral Vectors: A Patent Review, 6 RECENT PATENTS
ON DNA & GENE SEQUENCES 82, 82–90 (2012) (surveying the patent landscape of lentiviral
vectors); Christopher Thomas Scott, The Zinc Finger Nuclease Monopoly, 23 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 915, 917 (2005) [hereinafter Scott, ZFN Monopoly] (“How did Sangamo
reach its catbird’s seat? Credit CEO Edward Lanphier. In 1995, Lanphier was head of
business development and chief financial officer of Alameda, California’s Somatix Therapy,
a vector-based gene therapy company. . . . Somatix’s proprietary core was a gene vector
delivery system.”).

97 N.C. L. REV. 1497 (2019)

2019]

PICKS AND SHOVELS OF VECTOR PATENTS

1501

equipment into cells that do not normally have them.9 And like most
pick-and-shovel businesses, the companies responsible for geneediting vectors operate by strategically using secrecy to their
advantage10—if everyone knew how to procure a gold rush’s necessary
equipment, they would do it themselves. This Article explores a few of
the ethical problems with this approach and what it says more generally
about patent policy.
While the phrase “pick-and-shovel play” sounds suggestive of
unethical profiteering, the term is used today in a much more anodyne
fashion simply to describe businesses that sell necessary equipment or
services to other, often flashier, businesses.11 Internet network
9. James E. DiCarlo, Anurag Deeconda & Stephen H. Tsang, Viral Vectors,
Engineered Cells and the CRISPR Revolution, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL MEDICINE
AND BIOLOGY 3 (Stephen H. Tsang ed., 2017); Christopher E. Nelson & Charles A.
Gersbach, Engineering Delivery Vehicles for Genome Editing, 7 ANN. REV. CHEMICAL &
BIOMOLECULAR ENGINEERING 637, 640–49 (2016); Christopher Thomas Scott & Laura
DeFrancesco, Gene Therapy’s Out-of-Body Experience, 34 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY
600, 601–04 (2016); Gayong Shim et al., Therapeutic Gene Editing: Delivery and Regulatory
Perspectives, 38 ACTA PHARMACOLOGICA SINICA 738, 739–40 (2017); Hao Yin, Kevin J.
Kauffman & Daniel G. Anderson, Delivery Technologies for Genome Editing, 16 NATURE
REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 387, 388–90 (2017).
10. See, e.g., Sergey Anokhin & Joakim Wincent, Technological Arbitrage
Opportunities and Interindustry Differences in Entry Rates, 29 J. BUS. VENTURING 437, 440
n.6 (2014) (“[E]ffective information exchange may even be purposefully sabotaged by
innovator firms.”); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN.
35, 40 (1997) (“[A]rbitrageurs do not share all their knowledge with investors, and cultivate
secrecy to protect their knowledge from imitation.”); Wesley Gray, Information Exchange
and the Limits of Arbitrage 4 (Munich Pers. RePEc Archive, Paper No. 11918, 2008),
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11918/1/MPRA_paper_11918.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9UTUFKE] (“Why are arbitragers telling other arbitragers about their investment
opportunities? According to efficient market logic, the rational arbitrager should act alone,
drive the price to the fundamental level, and reap all the rewards of the arbitrage he has
found.” (citation omitted)). See generally Matteo Acquilina et al., Asymmetries in Dark Pool
Reference Prices 10 (Fin. Conduct Auth., Occasional Paper No. 21, Sept. 2016),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/op16-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LMX-RM7N] (concluding
that “dark pools” of traded equities take advantage of price information “[l]atency [to] give
rise to arbitrage opportunities”); Huy N. Chau, Andrea Cosso & Claudio Fontana, The
Value of Informational Arbitrage (arXiv, Paper No. 1804.00442v1), https://arxiv.org/
pdf/1804.00442v1 [https://perma.cc/4MKX-G737] (modeling the value of information
asymmetries in arbitrage opportunities).
11. Jason Stutman, Who’s Making the Picks and Shovels of Tech?, WEALTH DAILY
(Jan. 20, 2017, 7:00 PM), https://www.wealthdaily.com/articles/whos-making-the-picks-andshovels-of-tech/8495 [https://perma.cc/95SR-WY93] (“A pick-and-shovel play is, at its core,
a company that sells products needed for a larger, overarching industry to operate.”); PickAnd-Shovel Play, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pick-and-shovelplay.asp [https://perma.cc/Q37F-WUWH] (“A pick-and-shovel play is an investment
strategy that invests in the underlying technology needed to produce a good or service
instead of in the final output. It is a way to invest in an industry without having to endure
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equipment, product testing services, oil and gas storage, railcar
equipment, and chemical manufacturers are all modern examples of
pick-and-shovel plays.12 The origins of the phrase, however, are
perhaps more instructive as to both why and how pick-and-shovel plays
are often profitable ventures. In 1848, Samuel Brannan, a store owner
at Sutter’s Fort, California, bought tin pans for 20¢ and sold them to
prospectors for $15 each, all while publicizing the discovery of gold on
the American River outside Sacramento.13 He quickly became a
millionaire.14 But the core of his success was not so much his skills as a
salesman but his knowledge—hidden from his customers—about
where to obtain the equipment they otherwise needed.15 If everyone
knew where to buy tin pans for 20¢, no one would have bought them
from Sam Brannan for $15. The lesson of Brannan’s sale of tin pans is
this: at the core of most good pick-and-shovel plays lies a devil’s
bargain of secrecy and publicity.16
If gene-editing technologies are gold, then the vectors used to
implement the technologies are picks and shovels. Most gene-editing
technologies rely on enzymes—typically DNA-cutting enzymes called
nucleases—that are not naturally expressed in human cells.17 Physically
getting those enzymes into human cells is a recurrent challenge in
genetic engineering, and the vehicles used to do so are the enzymes’
vectors.18 Recent advances in vector technology have eased this process
and appear to be especially promising in the implementation of gene-

the risks of the market for the final product. It is named after the tools needed to take part
in the California Gold Rush.”).
12. E.g., Goodnight & Green, supra note 7, at 125; Maine et al., supra note 7, at 184;
AnnaLisa Kraft, A Golden Portfolio with 5 Pick-and-Shovel Stocks, MOTLEY FOOL (Oct.
18, 2013, 6:00 PM), https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2013/10/18/five-picks-andshovel-stocks-that-get-er-done.aspx [https://perma.cc/KU2F-RQQH].
13. FRANK K. MARTIN, A DECADE OF DELUSIONS: FROM SPECULATIVE
CONTAGION TO THE GREAT RECESSION 21 n.9 (2011) (“A metal pan that sold for 20 cents
a few days earlier was now available from Brannan for 15 dollars.”); Douglas S. Watson,
Herald of the Gold Rush: Sam Brannan, 10 CAL. HIST. SOC’Y Q. 298, 301 (1931) (“Rushing
into San Francisco’s Plaza, he doffed his broad-brimmed black hat, and holding aloft a bottle
of glittering particles in his left hand, he bellowed in his great bull voice: ‘GOLD! GOLD!
GOLD! From the American River!’ The Gold Rush was born that instant.”).
14. Newell G. Bringhurst, Samuel Brannan and His Forgotten Final Years, 79 S. CAL.
Q. 139, 139 (1997).
15. See id. at 145 (“Before Brannan allowed word of the discovery to leak out, the
enterprising businessman scoured northern California purchasing and stocking his store
with any and all merchandise of any conceivable use to the gold seekers.”).
16. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
17. See supra text accompanying note 9.
18. See supra text accompanying note 9.
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editing technologies like CRISPR.19 Given the interest—and likely
profitability—of
gene-editing
therapies,
underlying
vector
technologies are especially valuable.20 As such, vector technology
companies have deployed a strategy reminiscent of Brannan: they have
publicized and patented the basic contours of some aspects of their
technology while keeping others entirely secret. For example, uniQure
touts a “Best-in-Class” vector delivery system,21 protected by a host of
patents that cover its technology.22 But—by uniQure’s own
admission—“significant aspects of the process by which we
manufacture our gene therapies are based on unpatented trade secrets
and know-how.”23 MaxCyte, another vector company, similarly
provides a “patented, high-performance cell-engineering platform.”24
But its patent applications do not disclose critical aspects of the
platform, such as important manufacturing details.25 And Spark
Therapeutics—a gene-therapy company proud of its “cutting-edge
vector design,” with several pending patent applications to boot—
quietly makes use of an important safety-enhancing trade-secret
technology owned by another company, Selecta Biosciences.26

19. See supra text accompanying note 9; see also infra Section I.A.
20. See Scott, ZFN Monopoly, supra note 8, at 917 (discussing the profitability of
Somatix); Scott & DeFrancesco, supra note 9, at 603 (noting bluebird bio’s then market cap
of $1.35 billion). In addition, Spark Therapeutics, a viral vector platform company, has a
market cap of almost $4.16 billion. Stock Quote: Spark Therapeutics, Inc., BLOOMBERG,
https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/ONCE:US [https://perma.cc/7BYY-2S3S (dark archive)]
(last updated May 8, 2019).
21. uniQure’s Technology: Excellence in Gene Therapy Through Innovative Modular
Technology, Proprietary Manufacturing and the Experience to Achieve Success, UNIQURE,
http://www.uniqure.com/gene-therapy/uniqure-technology.php [https://perma.cc/6F8N-9B6E]
[hereinafter uniQure’s Technology].
22. Gene Therapy: Intellectual Property, UNIQURE, http://www.uniqure.com/genetherapy/gene-therapy-intellectual-property.php [https://perma.cc/69UM-4GJ6].
23. UNIQURE N.V., ANNUAL REPORT 2017, at 16 (2018), http://www.uniqure.com/
uniQure%20Annual%20Accounts%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJD3-5TZK].
24. About Us: Driving a New Generation of Cell-based Medicines, MAXCYTE,
https://www.maxcyte.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/7SQF-9WE3] [hereinafter About Us].
25. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 9,132,153 (filed May 24, 2013) (claiming methods of
modifying certain cells with mRNA, without disclosing specific mRNA sequences); U.S.
Patent No. 8,450,112 (filed Apr. 9, 2009) (same).
26. Selecta Biosciences, Inc., Annual Report 4 (Form 10-K) (Mar. 27, 2017),
http://ir.selectabio.com/static-files/35d1c085-9947-4d8d-aa61-dd3c05d0b280 [https://perma.cc/
3C4F-P7N5]; Spark Therapeutics, Inc., Annual Report 19 (Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2018),
http://ir.sparktx.com/static-files/28cb5c84-8bf4-4aea-b028-60a3d5278b8b [https://perma.cc/
5DFR-HTT3].
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This divided strategy of patenting, commercialization, and secrecy
is not atypical in the biotechnology space.27 But it poses some specific
ethical problems for gene editing as a therapeutic. First, it makes the
risk of gene-editing therapies wholly uncertain and difficult to assess.28
Given gene editing’s recent successes, and the horrifying nature of
many genetic diseases, patients and subjects may be pressured into
experimental therapies with imperfect information about a vector’s
overall safety profile.29 Historically, it is difficulties with gene therapies’
vectors—not the therapies’ genetic modifications themselves—that
have resulted in trial subjects’ deaths and adverse events.30 Second,
where patent information does exist, it may not be trustworthy—for a
number of reasons, the information disclosed in patents tends to be
unreliable and based on entirely insufficient preclinical evidence.31
Third, the lack of sufficient information about the mechanisms and
27. Karl F. Jorda, Patent and Trade Secret Complementariness: An Unsuspected
Synergy, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 29 (2008) (describing the case of Premarin (conjugated
estrogens)); W. Nicholson Price II, Expired Patents, Trade Secrets, and Stymied Competition,
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1611, 1624–26 (2017) (describing this dynamic for biologics);
Brenda M. Simon & Ted Sichelman, Data-Generating Patents, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 377, 406
(2017) (discussing the “use of patents and trade secrets as complements . . . in fields in which
some disclosure of post-patenting data is required for regulatory purposes, such as medical
devices or pharmaceuticals”).
28. See Clare E. Thomas, Anja Ehrhardt & Mark A. Kay, Progress and Problems with
the Use of Viral Vectors for Gene Therapy, 4 NATURE REV. GENETICS 346, 346 (2003)
(reviewing “the advances in the development of viral vectors, as well as discussing the
substantial challenges that remain before gene therapy can truly fulfil all of its promises”);
Aaron D. Levine, Revolutionary New Cancer Therapies Come with Big Risks. Drug Makers
Must Be Prepared, STAT (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/11/08/car-t-cancerdeath-pharma-companies/ [https://perma.cc/G3QM-ZWDE] (discussing some of the risks
of immunotherapy vectors).
29. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., HUMAN GENOME EDITING:
SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND GOVERNANCE 7 (2017) [hereinafter NASEM, HUMAN GENOME
EDITING] (noting gene editing’s potential to create “social pressure[s] for people to use
technologies they would not otherwise choose”); id. at 49–51 (listing some of the
uncertainties surrounding new viral vectors); Levine, supra note 28 (noting “the clamor of
individual patients and patient organizations to rapidly expand the use of CAR-T therapy
. . . and accompanying pressures” despite clinical trial subjects’ deaths).
30. See NASEM, HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 29, at 88–89 (describing
safety issues with gene-editing vectors); Thomas et al., supra note 28, at 347 (discussing
adverse events of gene-editing vectors); Levine, supra note 28 (discussing the potential for
CAR-T clinical trial deaths).
31. See Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, 66 DUKE L.J. 845,
883–85 (2017) [hereinafter Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox] (“[D]rug
developers often rely on early preclinical studies to bolster their patents. By design, these
studies often have small sample sizes; employ little statistical power; and, of course, suffer
from conflicts of interest between industrial researchers and their employers—all hallmarks
of irreproducibility.”).
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reliability of gene-editing vectors—through published research that
would fully test them—hampers physicians’ ability to properly inform
their patients of the benefits and burdens of a given course of
treatment.32 And fourth, having an additional layer of patent
protection for gene-editing technologies is likely to contribute to
relatively higher monetary costs of treatment where such therapies are
available.33 This is especially problematic where new DNA- and RNAbased therapies already routinely command close to a half-million
dollars for a course of treatment, prices that threaten to break healthcare payer systems.34
At the same time, these problems with patents’ role in the pickand-shovel play shine some light on patent law’s disclosure function.35
32. See NASEM, HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 29, at 26 (“[O]utside of a
study, ‘off-label’ use in clinical care is entirely legal, and has become a common practice
among physicians with respect to drugs, and might be available for a gene transfer product
using genome editing once it is approved. Physicians use their own expertise and sources of
information, as well as the advice of professional societies.”); George A. Beller, President’s
Page: Convocation Address, 35 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1694, 1695 (2000) (“A second
ethical challenge arises with the need to disclose to patients all the risks from potentially
dangerous new treatments such as gene therapy using viral vectors. We must let patients
know all the risks, and we must explain those risks in language that is easily understood.”);
Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient and Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights and Obligations
in the Physician-Patient Relationship, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 47, 52 (1994)
(arguing that “physician’s autonomy as a physician is also grounded in the possession of
expert knowledge needed by sick people and society”); Scott, ZFN Monopoly, supra note
8, at 918 (reporting that some “physician-scientists” support an “open resource” of geneediting information); see also Dianne Nicol et al., Key Challenges in Bringing CRISPRMediated Somatic Cell Therapy into the Clinic, 9 GENOME MED. 85, 87 (2017) (“Issues
surrounding patent ownership and validity feed into clinical delivery.”).
33. See Lori Knowles, Westerly Luth & Tania Bubela, Paving the Road to Personalized
Medicine: Recommendations on Regulatory, Intellectual Property and Reimbursement
Challenges, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 453, 492–94 (2017) (describing the literature on the
connection between personalized medicine and patents); Jacob S. Sherkow, CRISPR,
Patents, and the Public Health, 90 YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 667, 667–68 (2017) [hereinafter
Sherkow, Public Health] (discussing patents’ contribution to gene-therapy drug pricing).
34. Robert Cook-Deegan, Gene Patents, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND BENCH TO
CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR JOURNALISTS,
POLICYMAKERS, AND CAMPAIGNS 69 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008) (“One concern is that
patents might make the cost of genetic tests and genetic therapies unacceptably high.”);
Sherkow, Public Health, supra note 33, at 668–69 (discussing genetic therapies in the context
of insurance reimbursement); Meghana Keshavan, We May Soon Have Our First $1 Million
Drug. Who Will Pay for It? And How?, STAT (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/
2017/10/13/gene-therapy-pricing/ [https://perma.cc/SAB8-5CCT] (reporting that a gene
vector company’s patented treatment “could cost $1 million per patient” and asking
whether private insurers or “taxpayers, via Medicaid and Medicare,” would be willing to
pay).
35. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1022 (1989) (“This enabling disclosure becomes
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Ideally, patents’ disclosure function goes beyond merely a tit-for-tat
trade of technical information—it allows markets and physicians to
critically assess whether, how, and to what extent to adopt a new
technology, and how much to pay for it.36 Contrary to pick-and-shovel
strategies, generally, robust disclosure in patents also allows users to
assess the costs of inventing around a particular technology rather than
licensing from the patent owner—that is, to decide whether to find tin
pans on one’s own or buy them from Sam Brannan.37 And lastly, it
freely available to the public as soon as the patent issues; the patent holder may not
thereafter monitor or control access to it.”); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA
L. REV. 539, 548 (2009) (“[Patent disclosure] permits society at large to apply the
information by freely making or using the patented invention after the expiration of the
patent.”); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 131 (2006)
(“[T]he public benefits from the disclosure of the invention because the public storehouse
of knowledge is thus enhanced, allowing others to rely upon the teachings of the patent to
generate even further, follow-on innovation.”); Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of
Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 624 (2010) (“[T]he technical information disclosed
in the patent document has potential immediate value to the public, which can use the
information for any purpose that does not infringe upon the claims.”).
36. See J. Jonas Anderson, Nontechnical Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1575
(2016) (“[A] patent can inform innovators, investors, and consumers about the value of an
inventive idea.”); Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 425 (2010) (“Disclosure may provide a better justification [of the
patent system]. . . . [T]hese inventions are presumably of some worth to third parties as well,
be they competitors, scientists, or consumers.”); Fromer, supra note 35, at 548–49
(“[D]isclosure can stimulate others to design around the invention or conceive of new
inventions—either by improving upon the invention or by being inspired by it—even during
the patent term.”); Shubha Ghosh, Decentering the Consuming Self: Personalized Medicine,
Science, and the Market for Lemons, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 299, 337–38 (2015) (“As
information flourishes in personalized medicine, disclosures for consumers can become
more meaningful and provide guidance in how to respond to identified disease proclivities
and risk. This more liberal patent regime, combined with disclosure solutions, may provide
the best set of regulations to allow the market for personalized medicine to mature and the
field to progress for the benefits of patients.”).
37. See Kevin Emerson Collins, The Structural Implications of Inventors’ Disclosure
Obligations, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1785, 1786 (2016) (“From the moment patent disclosures are
published, the public has a privilege to freely engage in activities such as disseminating the
disclosed knowledge and employing the disclosed knowledge as an input into the creative
cognition that conceives yet further innovation, including both improvements and designarounds.”); Fromer, supra note 35, at 541 (“[P]atent disclosure indirectly stimulates future
innovation by revealing the invention’s design so that others can use it fruitfully when the
patent term expires and design around, improve upon, or be inspired by the invention, even
during the patent term.”); Jorda, supra note 27, at 26 (“Patent applications and patents, after
they are published and the invention is disclosed, often spur competitors to invent around
and develop improved products. These products may be separately patented, may not be
dominated, and may become commercially more important than the earlier, more basic
invention.”); Dmitry Karshtedt, The Completeness Requirement in Patent Law, 56 B.C. L.
REV. 949, 996 (2015) (noting that a “completeness” requirement in patent disclosures
“would encourage productive design-arounds”); Sean B. Seymore, Uninformative Patents,
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shows that poor disclosure may lead to suboptimal and early platform
standardization—users being locked into a particular iteration of a
required technology because it is one of few widely available.38 With
respect to gene-editing vectors, this means letting information about
vectors, rather than knowledge of diseases and the biology of vectorpayload systems, control which therapies are ultimately developed.39
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I gives a brief overview of
gene editing, vectors, and intellectual property, including a discussion
of the importance of vectors for gene-editing technologies and
historical concerns about their safety. Part II then describes the geneediting vector pick-and-shovel play at the core of this Article. On this
foundation, Part III explores several ethical issues arising from this
pick-and-shovel play—namely its unwarranted risk to patients and
clinical subjects, its reliance on unreliable preclinical evidence, its
effects on physician-patient decisionmaking, and its increased cost of
55 HOUS. L. REV. 377, 395–96 (2017) (“Theory posits that disclosure inspires others to learn
about the invention, design around it, improve upon it, or conceive of entirely new
inventions—all during the patent term.”); Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting
by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 135
(2010) (discussing the connection between patents’ disclosure and entrepreneur’s decisions
to avoid licensing); Gerald Sobel, Patent Scope and Competition: Is the Federal Circuit’s
Approach Correct?, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 59 n.181 (2002) (“Disclosure may permit
competitors to ‘invent around’ or invent improvements of the patented invention.”).
38. Cf. Jonathan M. Barnett, The Host’s Dilemma: Strategic Forfeiture in Platform
Markets for Informational Goods, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1861, 1865 (2011) (identifying the
“host’s dilemma” as attempts to “platform” the host’s technology without expropriating
user investment); Jorge L. Contreras, Much Ado About Hold-Up, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter Contreras, Much Ado] (manuscript at 7–8),
https://dc.law.utah.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1106&context=scholarship [https://perma.cc/
C522-HM3D] (“[T]he manufacturer’s cost of switching from the standardized technology to
an alternative may be prohibitive (a situation often referred to as ‘lock-in’).”); Mark A.
Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 606–13 (2005) (recounting the
history of early patents on “building blocks” of nascent technologies); Joseph Scott Miller,
Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm,
40 IND. L. REV. 351, 386 (2007) (“[A] central licensing entity [is] an example of the
corporate form as an access lock-in governance mechanism.”); Jesse L. Reynolds, Jorge L.
Contreras & Joshua D. Sarnoff, Solar Climate Engineering and Intellectual Property:
Toward a Research Commons, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 58–59 (2017) (describing how
patent platforming risks “technological lock-in” for solar climate engineering).
39. See, e.g., Luigi Naldini, Gene Therapy Returns to Centre Stage, 526 NATURE 351,
351 (2015) (noting the importance of vector biology in making gene therapy successful);
Michael F. Naso et al., Adeno-Associated Virus (AAV) as a Vector for Gene Therapy, 31
BIODRUGS 317, 317 (2017) (“There has been a resurgence in gene therapy efforts that is
partly fueled by the identification and understanding of new gene delivery vectors.”);
Thomas et al., supra note 28, at 346 (“The message we have extracted from a history of
anticipation and disappointment is that the future success of gene therapy will be founded
on a thorough understanding of vector biology and pharmacology.”).
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treatment. Finally, Part IV uses this analysis to illuminate several
aspects of patents’ disclosure function including consumer assessment,
the costs of inventing around, and early platform standardization.
I. GENE EDITING, VECTORS, AND IP
A. Gene-Editing Technologies
Genome editing is “a powerful new tool for making precise
additions, deletions, and alterations to the genome—an organism’s
complete set of genetic material.”40 Since 1997, a suite of new geneediting approaches has emerged, with the CRISPR/Cas9 system
perhaps the most promising.41 This system—guided by flexible and
“programmable” strands of RNA, DNA’s molecular cousin—has
made editing of the genome more precise, efficient, feasible, and less
costly relative to previous protein-based technologies such as zinc
finger nucleases (“ZFNs”) or transcription activator-like effector
nucleases (“TALENs”).42
With these advances has come an explosion of interest in the
possible applications of genome editing, both in conducting basic
research and the potential to prevent, treat, and cure disease and
disability. Genome editing could provide insights into reproductive
failures and improve contraception and fertility treatments.43 In
embryos, CRISPR has been used to study the genetics of early human

40. NASEM, HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 29, at 1; see also NUFFIELD
COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, GENOME EDITING: AN ETHICAL REVIEW 4 (2016),
http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/Genome-editing-an-ethical-review.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H6QF-7N9U] (“What we will refer to as ‘genome editing’ is the practice
of making targeted interventions at the molecular level of DNA or RNA function,
deliberately to alter the structural or functional characteristics of biological entities.”); JinSoo Kim, Genome Editing Comes of Age, 11 NATURE PROTOCOLS 1573, 1573 (2016).
41. See Le Cong et al., Multiplex Genome Engineering Using CRISPR/Cas Systems, 339
SCIENCE 819, 819–22 (2013); Jennifer A. Doudna & Emmanuelle Charpentier, The New
Frontier of Genome Engineering with CRISPR-Cas9, 346 SCIENCE 1077, 1077 (2014);
Patrick D. Hsu, Eric S. Lander & Feng Zhang, Development and Applications of CRISPRCas9 for Genome Engineering, 157 CELL 1262, 1263–64 (2014).
42. Rajat M. Gupta & Kiran Musunuru, Expanding the Genetic Editing Tool Kit: ZFNs,
TALENs, and CRISPR-Cas9, 124 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 4154, 4156–57 (2014); see
also Jeffrey C. Miller et al., A TALE Nuclease Architecture for Efficient Genome Editing,
29 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 143, 143 (2011); Fyodor D. Urnov et al., Genome Editing
with Engineered Zinc Finger Nucleases, 11 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 636, 636 (2010).
43. Meizhu Bai et al., Spermatogenic Cell-Specific Gene Mutation in Mice via
CRISPR/Cas9, 43 J. GENETICS & GENOMICS 289, 290–92 (2016).
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development.44 In ex vivo approaches—that is, in cells physically
outside of an organism—editing platforms have been used to deliver
“gene-free” gene therapy for animals,45 revert genetic defects such as
hemophilia A in stem cells,46 and functionally correct genetic mutations
of human Duchenne muscular dystrophy.47
This interest extends beyond correcting currently existing
defects—it also includes curiosity into fixing such errors before they
take root: editing eggs, sperm, and embryos (i.e., the human
“germline”) to prevent genetic disease in future children and their
descendants.48 Recently, controversial experiments by researchers
using nonviable and viable human embryos used germline editing in
genetic disease, examining the safety and feasibility of CRISPR.49 In a
review published in June, scientists connected the cellular repair
process to “mosaicism”—a patchwork of edited and unedited cells.50
Other researchers have found that similar techniques resulted in
incomplete editing and “off-target effects,” edits to subjects’ DNA that
were otherwise unintended.51 And even when gene editing does work
as technically intended, it may result in unpredictable and harmful
effects. In a recent study, U.K. researchers found significant numbers
of on-target mutations, but with potentially pathogenic consequences.52
In the United States, ex vivo clinical trials for cancer and sickle cell
44. Norah M.E. Fogarty et al., Genome Editing Reveals a Role for OCT4 in Human
Embryogenesis, 550 NATURE 67, 67 (2017).
45. See Thomas Gaj et al., Targeted Gene Knockout by Direct Delivery of Zinc-Finger
Nuclease Proteins, 9 NATURE METHODS 805, 805, 807 (2012).
46. Chul-Yong Park et al., Functional Correction of Large Factor VIII Gene
Chromosomal Inversions in Hemophilia A Patient-Derived iPSCs Using CRISPR-Cas9, 17
CELL STEM CELL 213, 213 (2015).
47. Courtney S. Young et al., A Single CRISPR-Cas9 Deletion Strategy that Targets the
Majority of DMD Patients Restores Dystrophin Function in hiPSC-Derived Muscle Cells, 18
CELL STEM CELL 533, 533 (2016).
48. NASEM, HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 29, at 91–93.
49. See generally Xiangjin Kang et al., Introducing Precise Genetic Modifications into
Human 3PN Embryos by CRISPR/Cas-mediated Genome Editing, 33 J. ASSISTED REPROD.
& GENETICS 581 (2016) (discussing viable embryos); Puping Liang et al., CRISPR/Cas9mediated Gene Editing in Human Tripronuclear Zygotes, 6 PROTEIN & CELL 363 (2015)
(discussing nonviable embryos); Hong Ma et al., Correction of a Pathogenic Gene Mutation
in Human Embryos, 548 NATURE 413 (2017) (discussing nonviable embryos).
50. Stella Baliou et al., CRISPR Therapeutic Tools for Complex Genetic Disorders and
Cancer, 53 INT’L J. ONCOLOGY 443, 450 (2018).
51. E.g., Shim et al., supra note 9, at 747 (noting the risk of unsafe off-target effects for
some vectors).
52. Michael Kosicki, Kärt Tomberg & Allan Bradley, Repair of Double-Strand Breaks
Induced by CRISPR-Cas9 Leads to Large Deletions and Complex Rearrangements, 36
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 765, 765 (2018).
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anemia are set to commence, though the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) has placed a hold on the sickle cell trial
sponsored by CRISPR Therapeutics.53 Despite substantial concerns
over the safety of in vivo approaches, China has treated over eighty
subjects with CRISPR interventions.54 This now includes news of
Chinese researcher He Jiankui, who “engineered” the birth of two
CRISPR-edited twins, with a third baby on the way. (In dramatic
fashion, this was announced in December 2018 at an international
human genome-editing summit in Hong Kong.) He’s procedure was
deceptive, violated Chinese law, flaunted international ethical norms,
and put the babies at physical risk. Dr. He has since been fired from his
university, and Dr. He, his mentors, and his collaborators are now
under investigation.55 Nonetheless, the outrage from the international
scientific and bioethics communities was unanimous, and such
limitations have the potential to stand as major hurdles facing eventual
clinical applications.
B.

Invention, Disclosure, and the Gene-Editing Patent Estate

Despite this potential for peril, the promise of CRISPR and other
gene-editing technologies has yielded substantial patent estates. The
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) has issued over 450
patents to core aspects of CRISPR as of the date of this writing.56 A
more thorough landscaping analysis by researchers in Scandinavia and
Colorado found hundreds more patent families on CRISPR
components worldwide.57 Currently, fundamental aspects of one
53. Rich Haridy, FDA Hits Pause on One of the First US Human Clinical Trials to Use
CRISPR, NEW ATLAS (May 31, 2018), https://newatlas.com/us-crispr-human-trial-holdfda/54862/ [https://perma.cc/9W4N-J78D].
54. Preetika Rana, Amy Dockser Marcus & Wenxin Fan, China Races Ahead in Gene
Editing, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2018, at A1, A10.
55. Id.; Christopher Thomas Scott & Cynthia Selin, What to Expect When Expecting
CRISPR Baby Number Four, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Mar. 2019, at 7, 7–9; Todd Ackerman,
Lawyers Say Rice Professor Not Involved in Controversial Gene-Edited Babies Research,
HOUS. CHRON. (Dec. 13, 2018, 9:11 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houstontexas/houston/article/Lawyers-say-Rice-professor-not-involved-in-13465277.php/ [https://perma.cc/
496Z-Z9VC]; Antonio Regalado, The Chinese Scientist Who Claims He Made CRISPR
Babies
Is
Under
Investigation,
MIT
TECH. REV.
(Nov.
26,
2018),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612466/the-chinese-scientist-who-claims-he-made-crisprbabies-has-been-suspended-without-pay/
[https://perma.cc/PH8G-WG9E];
Christopher
Thomas Scott, Opinion, Gene-Edited Babies Have Been Born. Now What?, HOUS. CHRON.
(Dec. 4, 2018, 10:24 AM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/local/gray-matters/article/
gene-edited-babies-crispr-ethics-research-13439892.php [https://perma.cc/8ZG7-8PWN].
56. Sherkow, CRISPR Patent Landscape, supra note 3, at 3.
57. Egelie et al., supra note 3, at 1027–28.
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variant of CRISPR—applications using the Cas9 enzyme—are the
subject of a particularly heated patent dispute between the University
of California, Berkeley, and the Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard.58
The dispute has raised a host of concerns about the future of CRISPR
research and commercial development as well as the role of patenting
in modern universities and research centers.59 Similar controversies are
ongoing for ZFNs and TALENs, alike.60
At the same time, these technologies are undergoing a literal
renaissance—a “rebirthing”—despite, or perhaps because of, the
patent estates covering their earlier versions. New enzymes have been
found and in some cases engineered to use the technologies’ basic
components without treading on the claims of ongoing patent
disputes.61 Developing synthetic or recombinant enzymes is also used
to further improve the technology—to make gene editing more or less
error prone, available to more portions of the genome, or increasingly
precise.62 In describing CRISPR, for example, the moniker “gene
editing” has accordingly conjured up metaphors of word processing,
with Cas9, the enzyme that kicked off the CRISPR craze in 2012, being
likened to cut-and-paste.63 To further the analogy, new enzymes, to
date, can find-and-replace, randomly delete, and highlight text.64
58. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Broad Inst., Inc., 903 F.3d 1286, 1289–90 (Fed. Cir.
2018).
59. E.g., Jorge L. Contreras & Jacob S. Sherkow, CRISPR, Surrogate Licensing, and
Scientific Discovery, 355 SCIENCE 698, 698 (2017); Sherkow, Public Health, supra note 33,
at 668–69 (noting the potential effects of the dispute on insurance coverage); Jacob S.
Sherkow, Pursuit of Profit Poisons Collaboration, 532 NATURE 172, 172 (2016).
60. E.g., Helga Schinkel & Stefan Schillberg, Genome Editing: Intellectual Property and
Product Development in Plant Biotechnology, 35 PLANT CELL REP. 1487, 1488 (2016)
(discussing TALEN patent controversies); Scott, ZFN Monopoly, supra note 8, at 915–16
(discussing ZFN patent controversies).
61. Sherkow, CRISPR Patent Landscape, supra note 3, at 4 (“New applications for
CRISPR . . . continue to arise at a rapid pace. . . . This includes the continual discovery of
new nucleases, such as CasX, CasY, and Cas13a, that belong to new types and subtypes of
CRISPR-Cas systems.”).
62. See generally Jason M. Gehrke et al., High-Precision CRISPR-Cas9 Base Editors
with Minimized Bystander and Off-Target Mutations (bioRXiv, Working Paper No. 273938,
2018), https://www.biorxiv.org/content/biorxiv/early/2018/03/01/273938.full.pdf [http://perma.cc/
D89Y-FTUH (staff-uploaded archive)] (using CRISPR/Cas9 technology to improve the
precision of base editors).
63. See, e.g., Sharon Begley, Meet One of the World’s Most Groundbreaking Scientists.
He’s 34., STAT (Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.statnews.com/2015/11/06/hollywood-inspiredscientist-rewrite-code-life/ [https://perma.cc/EPL6-72RT] (containing a video analogizing
CRISPR to a word processor).
64. See Jonathan S. Gootenberg et al., Multiplexed and Portable Nucleic Acid Detection
Platform with Cas13, Cas12a, and Csm6, 360 SCIENCE 439, 439 (2018) (using the
nonspecificity of some enzymes to randomly delete other nucleic acid segments); Charleston
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In virtually all of these cases, these technologies—including the
original CRISPR/Cas9 technology—have been widely disclosed.
Researchers have published thousands of papers on CRISPR since its
advent in 2012.65 As an example of how quickly the field is moving,
genome-editing publications increased by 1453% from 2011–2016.66
There is video, using high-speed atomic-force microscopy, of Cas9
cleaving a piece of DNA.67 CRISPR has been so thoroughly adopted
that it has become an internet meme—“CRISPR/Cas9: So Hot Right
Now”68—and investors in companies working with CRISPR have
complained of “CRISPR fatigue.”69 Researchers have largely made
their materials freely available through a revolutionary nonprofit
organization, AddGene, which supplies CRISPR materials—namely
constructs of DNA that code for CRISPR components—and materials
transfer agreements and documentation to use the technology for
academic scientists.70 Patents in this area most thoroughly disclose the
science undergirding their claims; whatever deficiencies exist are

Noble et al., Evolutionary Dynamics of CRISPR Gene Drives, 3 SCI. ADVANCES, no.
e1601964, Apr. 5, 2017, at 1, 1 (likening CRISPR gene drives to a search-and-replace
function); Lei S. Qi et al., Repurposing CRISPR as an RNA-Guided Platform for SequenceSpecific Control of Gene Expression, 152 CELL 1173, 1173 (2013) (showing that catalytically
inactive CRISPR enzymes can regulate gene expression, akin to highlighting text to increase
its visibility).
65. CRISPR, ELSEVIER, https://www.elsevier.com/research-intelligence/campaigns/
crispr [https://perma.cc/YU62-MYKP].
66. STAT’s Stats of the Year: 2016 by the Numbers, STAT (Dec. 28, 2016),
https://www.statnews.com/2016/12/28/stat-stats-year-in-numbers/ [https://perma.cc/6F62A866].
67. Sarah Zhang, An Astonishing Video Shows CRISPR Editing DNA in Real Time,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/11/crisprvideo-real-time/545603/ [https://perma.cc/6CMT-WVWE].
68. Mugatu
So
Hot
Right
Now,
IMGFLIP,
https://imgflip.com/i/1fdwb4
[http://perma.cc/U6R6-WBLF]; cf. ZOOLANDER (Paramount Pictures 2001) (movie from
which the meme originated). And, in a remarkable, surreal example of life imitating art,
scientists have put a “meme” in bacterial cells using CRISPR. Taylor Hatmaker, Scientists
Have Inserted a GIF of a Horse into Living Bacteria — Did Your Brain Just Explode?,
TECHCRUNCH (July 12, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/07/12/harvard-nature-crisprcas1-cas2-horse-gif/ [https://perma.cc/PP5H-Y4WM].
69. Max Nisen, CRISPR Therapeutics IPO: Bad Timing is Costly, BLOOMBERG (Oct.
20, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2016-10-20/crispr-therapeutics-ipobad-timing-is-costly [https://perma.cc/C6W5-QUV4 (dark archive)].
70. ADDGENE, https://www.addgene.org/ [http://perma.cc/9SXP-Y2PG]; see also Neil
C. Thompson & Samantha Zyontz, Who Tries (and Who Succeeds) in Staying at the
Forefront of Science: Evidence from the DNA-Editing Technology, CRISPR 9–10 (Nov.
17, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3073227 [http://perma.cc/VUN3-9237].
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readily ascertainable from the scientific literature.71 Patent estates and
patent disputes notwithstanding, basic information about CRISPR has
been disclosed to all.
C.

The Importance of Vectors

Whichever fundamental gene-editing technology is used, it needs
a way to deliver its machinery into cells—“vectors.”72 The concept of
gene editing as therapy for genetic disease is straightforward: a vector
carrying a gene-editing enzyme, or DNA coding for a gene-editing
enzyme, delivers its payload to a cell.73 This is frequently accompanied
by DNA or RNA to replace the defective gene (a “knock-in”
approach) or, more simply, introduce a mutation into a functioning
gene (a “knock-out” strategy).74 Gene editing can be accomplished
using vectors ex vivo: the transference of genetic material to cells that
have been removed from a patient.75 After editing, the corrected cells
are then subsequently reintroduced.76 Alternatively, a vector carrying
the functional gene copy is directly injected into the body to achieve in
vivo gene transfer.77 In either case, for gene-editing technology to
actually work as therapy it must be accompanied by a safe, effective,
and suitable vector.78
To date, a handful of experiments have shown the safety and
efficacy of several vectors that may ultimately prove useful for gene
therapy.79 These can largely be grouped into two types: nonviral
71. See Egelie et al., supra note 3, at 1028–29 (assessing the technical disclosures of
CRISPR patent families).
72. See DiCarlo et al., supra note 9, at 3; Nelson & Gersbach, supra note 9, at 640–49;
Scott & DeFrancesco, supra note 9, at 601–04; Yin et al., supra note 9, at 388–90.
73. See DiCarlo et al., supra note 9, at 3–4.
74. See id. at 5–6.
75. Nelson & Gersbach, supra note 9, at 647; Scott & DeFrancesco, supra note 9, at 600;
Shim et al., supra note 9, at 740; Thomas et al., supra note 28, at 348; Yin et al., supra note
9, at 390.
76. See Nelson & Gersbach, supra note 9, at 647; Scott & DeFrancesco, supra note 9, at
600; Shim et al., supra note 9, at 740; Thomas et al., supra note 28, at 348; Yin et al., supra
note 9, at 390.
77. Shim et al., supra note 9, at 740; Thomas et al., supra note 28, at 350; Yin et al., supra
note 9, at 392–94.
78. Nelson & Gersbach, supra note 9, at 637; see also Roland W. Herzog, Ou Cao &
Arun Srivastava, Two Decades of Clinical Gene Therapy—Success Is Finally Mounting, 9
DISCOVERY MED. 105, 105–06 (2010).
79. See Thomas et al., supra note 28, at 351–52 (reviewing some of the most promising
vectors). See generally Jacob S. Sherkow, Patricia J. Zettler & Henry T. Greely, Peer
Commentary, Is It ‘Gene Therapy’?, J.L. & BIOSCIENCES, no. lsy020, Sept. 18, 2018, at 1
(defining “gene therapy” and reviewing the safety of some vectors).
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vectors, those that do not make use of viruses; and viral vectors, those
that do.80 Each has demonstrated some successes in laboratory
experiments. CRISPR systems, for example, have given promise that
delivery of DNA, RNA, or an active enzyme to the target tissue or cells
of interest can be achieved nonvirally.81 Ex vivo studies—those editing
cells once removed from the body—currently lead the way for
advances in nonviral vectors. The same applies to most preclinical
experiments. Such studies use diverse mechanisms to achieve editing
nonvirally through methods like direct injections of plasmid DNA or
RNA.82 In one experiment using human-induced pluripotent stem cells
carrying the Duchenne muscular dystrophy mutation, plasmid delivery
of a CRISPR protein restored the cells’ dystrophin function.83 In
another, a similar approach successfully corrected deficiencies in the
human β-thalassemia gene in mice.84 Physically disrupting cells is yet
another ex vivo delivery method through electroporation or cellpenetrating peptides and could conceivably be used in localized in vivo
cases.85 Liposomes, yet another nonviral method, have long been used
to transfect DNA and RNA into cells and, after thirty years of
development, have advanced into gene-therapy trials, most notably for
cystic fibrosis and cancer.86 Chinese researchers have reportedly used
liposomes to deliver CRISPR into mice with solid tumors, improving
their survival.87 Finally, protein-based systems can deliver a functional
CRISPR complex—the Cas9 enzyme along with guide RNA—directly
inside target cells.88

80. Nelson & Gersbach, supra note 9, at 637, 640–42, 646–47.
81. Id. at 642.
82. See id. at 649. These pose technical hurdles, however: nonviral vectors must be
engineered to protect their DNA and RNA from degradation by other enzymes during
transport. Yin et al., supra note 9, at 391 (“[B]are nucleic acid is subject to degradation by
endogenous nucleases in the blood.”).
83. Young et al., supra note 47, at 533.
84. Zhanhui Ou et al., The Combination of CRISPR/Cas9 and iPSC Technologies in the
Gene Therapy of Human β-Thalassemia in Mice, 6 SCI. REP., no. 32463, Sept. 1, 2016, at 1,
1.
85. Kim, supra note 40, at 1575–76; Shim et al., supra note 9, at 740; Yin et al., supra
note 9, at 394.
86. Eric W. F. W. Alton et al., Correspondence, A Phase I/IIa Safety and Efficacy Study
of Nebulized Liposome-Mediated Gene Therapy for Cystic Fibrosis Supports a Multidose
Trial, 192 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 1389, 1389–90 (2015).
87. Zeming Chen et al., Targeted Delivery of CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Cancer Gene
Therapy via Liposome-Templated Hydrogel Nanoparticles, 27 ADVANCED FUNCTIONAL
MATERIALS, no. 1703036, Oct. 16, 2017, at 1, 1–2.
88. See Nelson & Gersbach, supra note 9, at 638–40.
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Nonetheless, the most widely used and studied gene delivery
vehicles are viral vectors.89 Viruses, by their nature, have evolved ways
to efficiently deliver their genetic payload to the cells; that is how all
viruses operate, from the benign to the malignant.90 Viral vectors for
gene therapy are differentiated by the form in which they carry their
genetic material, widely known as the Baltimore classification system.91
Viruses that use double-stranded DNA—like DNA found in the
genome—are Class I.92 Some viruses that use single-stranded RNA—
like the Human Immunodeficiency Virus—are Class VI.93 But in all
cases, the principle of using viruses for gene editing is the same: genetic
material is inserted into a target cell and makes use of the cell’s own
machinery to edit the cell’s genome.94 Further, many viral vectors—like
Class VI viruses—make such modifications permanent.95 And despite
billions of years of evolution and five decades of research, much about
their manufacture, safety, and how the human body responds to their
molecular machinery remains unknown.96
D. Gene-Editing Vectors and Safety
Although excitement about gene editing feels new and hopeful,
gene editing as therapy has a long and checkered history, with
significant safety issues arising from the vectors used.97 Adenoassociated viral vectors (“AAVs”), for example, are among the most
well-studied tools used in gene-therapy trials.98 While some attempts

89. See ADDGENE, VIRAL VECTORS 101: A DESKTOP RESOURCE 8 (2018) (ebook),
https://info.addgene.org/sign-up-to-receive-addgenes-viral-vectors-101-ebook [https://perma.cc/
AY93-EKPY] (“One well-established and widely popular technology (that scientists love to
discuss) is virus—specifically, using viruses as research tools.”).
90. Thomas et al., supra note 28, at 346 (“Viruses are highly evolved biological
machines that efficiently gain access to host cells and exploit the cellular machinery to
facilitate their replication.”).
91. LINDA BRUSLIND, MICROBIOLOGY 144 (2018), https://open.umn.edu/
opentextbooks/textbooks/microbiology-2017 [https://perma.cc/FJ65-3SJ6]; JANE FLINT ET
AL., PRINCIPLES OF VIROLOGY 21 (4th ed. 2015).
92. BRUSLIND, supra note 91, at 144–45.
93. HARVEY LODISH ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY § 6.3 (4th ed. 2000).
94. Thomas et al., supra note 28, at 346.
95. ADDGENE, supra note 89, at 105 (“Viruses of the Retroviridae or Retrovirus family,
which includes the gamma-retrovirus and lentivirus genera, have the unique ability to
integrate permanently into the host genome and thereby enable long-term stable gene
expression.”).
96. See Yin et al., supra note 9, at 397.
97. Thomas et al., supra note 28, at 346 (“The science of gene therapy has a turbulent
history.”).
98. Nelson & Gersbach, supra note 9, at 646.
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with AAVs were successful, the most notable result was the first death
of a gene-therapy clinical-trial volunteer. In a 1999 Phase I trial to study
corrections to a significant metabolic disorder, one participant, Jesse
Gelsinger, died shortly after administration of the vector and the
replacement gene; he developed a severe immune reaction to the
infusion.99 The tragedy laid bare a host of ethical shortcomings of firstin-human gene-editing trials, including overzealous investigators,
financial conflicts of interest, improper informed consent, and
insufficient attention paid to preclinical data.100 It also demonstrated
that one of gene editing’s principal dangers was not the delivered genes
themselves but the vectors used to deliver them.101
Other ex vivo gene-therapy trials carried out in Severe Combined
Immunodeficiency Disease (“SCID”) patients experienced similar
issues. The first trials suffered from limited efficacy; they made use of
mouse-related viral vectors, which poorly engrafted the stem cells used
for transformation.102 As a result, these early studies were written off
as largely unsuccessful.103 Later attempts to improve efficacy had
troubling results. Trials in France and the United Kingdom in 2000
cured nine boys with SCID but caused leukemia in five children.104 The
culprit, again, was the vector: a gamma retroviral vector (“g-RV”) used
in the study inserted its genetic payload within an oncogene. This gene,
when disrupted, increases the body’s propensity to develop cancer.105
“These events precipitated what is recognized as the field’s
nadir.”106 Though no participants in the U.S. retroviral trials suffered
adverse events, in 2003 the FDA halted twenty-seven other genetherapy trials.107 The tendencies of certain viruses like g-RVs to cause
99. Nikunj Somia & Inder M. Verma, Gene Therapy: Trials and Tribulations, 1
NATURE REV.: GENETICS 91, 95 (2000).
100. James M. Wilson, Lessons Learned from the Gene Therapy Trial for Ornithine
Transcarbamylase Deficiency, 96 MOLECULAR GENETICS & METABOLISM 151, 153–56
(2009).
101. See David A. Williams & Adrian J. Thrasher, Concise Review: Lessons Learned
from Clinical Trials of Gene Therapy in Monogenic Immunodeficiency Diseases, 3 STEM
CELLS TRANSLATIONAL MED. 636, 637 (2014).
102. Thomas et al., supra note 28, at 355.
103. See id.
104. See Scott & DeFrancesco, supra note 9, at 600–02; Williams & Thrasher, supra note
101, at 636–37; see also Marina Cavazzana-Calvo et al., Gene Therapy of Human Severe
Combined Immunodeficiency (SCID)-X1 Disease, 288 SCIENCE 669, 669–70 (2000); Salima
Hacein-Bey-Abina et al., A Serious Adverse Event After Successful Gene Therapy for XLinked Severe Combined Immunodeficiency, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 255, 255 (2003).
105. Scott & DeFrancesco, supra note 9, at 601–02.
106. Id. at 602.
107. Id. at 604.
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cancer, combined with the death of Jesse Gelsinger, led to a massive
retreat from gene-therapy development.108 By the early 2000s, simply
the term “‘gene therapy’ took on a more negative connotation as a
dangerous and unproven technology.”109
The recent elucidation of gene-editing technologies, however, has
reinvigorated interest in “gene therapy,” even while the safety of their
concomitant vectors remains unproven. One recent gene-therapy
trial—one of the first since the FDA’s 2003 stop order—resulted in the
vector-related death of several clinical trial subjects.110 Another genetherapy trial similarly killed yet another clinical trial subject.111
Nonetheless, gene editing—with or without safe vectors—now
continues apace.112
Besides toxicity—the likely culprit of some trial subjects’ geneediting deaths—gene editing and its attendant vectors raise three
principal safety concerns: mosaicism, efficiency, and off-target effects.
Mosaicism is the effect of gene-editing technologies only editing some
of the target cells in a given tissue.113 This creates a mosaic of edited
and unedited cells, the persistence of which is unclear.114 Recently,
Chinese scientists attempted the CRISPR technique in viable human
embryos and managed to correct gene mutations half the time.
However, the study revealed that one of two edited embryos was a
mosaic—a mixture of edited and unedited cells. It appears that
CRISPR made repairs after DNA replication so that when the single108. See Sherkow et al., supra note 79, at 4.
109. Id.
110. Laura DeFrancesco, CAR-Ts Forge Ahead, Despite Juno Deaths, 35 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 6, 6 (2017).
111. Lisa LaMotta, Death in Cellectis CAR-T Trial Leads to Clinical Hold,
BIOPHARMADIVE (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/cellectis-carttrial-death-clinical-hold/504185/ [https://perma.cc/H7QV-VMV5].
112. See François Baylis & Marus McLeod, First-in-Human Phase 1 CRISPR Gene
Editing Cancer Trials: Are We Ready?, 17 CURRENT GENE THERAPY 309, 309 (2017);
DeFrancesco, supra note 110, at 6; Catherine Offord, US Companies Launch CRISPR
Clinical Trial, SCIENTIST (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.the-scientist.com/news-opinion/uscompanies-launch-crispr-clinical-trial-64746 [https://perma.cc/7DSF-X2HF]; Sara Reardon,
First CRISPR Clinical Trial Gets Green Light from US Panel, NATURE (June 22, 2018),
https://www.nature.com/news/first-crispr-clinical-trial-gets-green-light-from-us-panel-1.20137
[https://perma.cc/R37U-LFWQ].
At the same time, the difficult ethical problems—such as investigative zeal,
professional and institutional conflicts of interest, proper informed consent, and inattention
to preclinical evidence—that plagued first-generation gene therapies were again raised as
expert groups pondered recommendations for the first U.S. ex vivo CRISPR clinical trial.
Baylis & McLeod, supra, at 309.
113. NASEM, HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 29, at 89.
114. Id.
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celled embryos continued to divide, some of the daughter cells
inherited unrepaired DNA.115 Other groups have reduced levels of
mosaicism by carefully timing the addition of the enzyme during
fertilization or certain phases of cell division, or by shortening the halflife of the Cas9 protein.116
Editing efficiency is another stumbling block. In a 2015 study, only
14.3% of nonviable human embryos were edited.117 Since then, vector
efficiencies have improved somewhat.118 The controversial Chinese
experiment that produced engineered human babies underscored
these two shortcomings of efficiency: the twins were both mosaics, and
one was incompletely edited, with cuts in one chromosome but not
another.119 Other work identified a potential flaw in the editing process,
which leaves cells “transiently vulnerable to the introduction of
chromosomal
rearrangements
and
other
[cancer-causing]
mutations.”120 Selecting cells whose DNA has been modified by
CRISPR, it seems, may also select cells with a mutated cancersuppressor gene.121 And now it is known that CRISPR can produce ontarget effects, causing large deletions and gene shuffling.122 After
editing, imperfections in the cell’s repair mechanism can rearrange
segments of DNA or incorporate unwanted stretches of DNA into the
chromosome.123
Finally, detecting off-target events—when the nucleases mutate
unintended stretches of DNA—will be essential to any calculation of
clinical readiness. Various methods have emerged for detecting and
measuring off-target mutations, including genome-wide profiling in

115. Lichun Tang et al., CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Gene Editing in Human Zygotes Using
Cas9 Protein, 292 MOLECULAR GENETICS & GENOMICS 525, 532 (2017). It appears as if
the engineered babies in the controversial He Jiankui case are indeed mosaics.
116. Hong Ma et al., Correction of a Pathogenic Gene Mutation in Human Embryos, 548
NATURE 413, 413 (2017); Zhuchi Tu et al., Promoting Cas9 Degradation Reduces Mosaic
Mutations in Non-Human Primate Embryos, 7 SCI. REP., no. 42081, Feb. 3, 2017, at 1, 1.
117. Liang et al., supra note 49, at 366.
118. See Ma et al., supra note 116, at 413.
119. Katarina Zimmer, CRISPR Scientists Slam Methods Used on Gene-Edited Babies,
SCIENTIST (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.the-scientist.com/news-opinion/crispr-scientistsslam-methods-used-on-gene-edited-babies--65167 [https://perma.cc/YVP6-Y6J2].
120. Emma Haapaniemi et al., CRISPR-Cas9 Genome Editing Induces a p53-Mediated
DNA Damage Response, 24 NATURE MED. 927, 930 (2018).
121. See id.
122. Kosicki et al., supra note 52, at 765.
123. Id. at 765–70.
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bulk populations of cells.124 Other strategies include minimizing offtarget mutations by improving genome-wide specificity of
CRISPR/Cas9.125
It is important to note that these experiments, and others designed
to optimize the eventual clinical use of CRISPR and other genomeediting technologies, will likely require the use of many thousands of
human embryos. The use of scarce and morally fraught resources such
as unwanted, donated embryos from IVF clinics and embryos made
expressly for research were dominant features of the human
embryonic-stem-cell debate.126 These controversies will continue as
CRISPR-mediated approaches march toward the clinic. As an
example, the CRISPR study on viable embryos conducted at Oregon
Health Sciences University used hundreds of embryos during the
course of the experiments.127 Taken together, these reports and others
underscore the dangers of a rush to the clinic for both in vivo and ex
vivo applications—including those reported in China and trials
contemplated in other countries.128
How are these safety risks being weighed in new gene-editing
trials? There are several places to look for clues, including the National
Institute of Health’s (“NIH”) Recombinant DNA Advisory
Committee (“RAC”) clinical trial approvals database.129 Until August
of 2018, the RAC reviewed gene-editing experiments in somatic
124. Taeyoung Koo, Jungjoon Lee & Jin-Soo Kim, Measuring and Reducing Off-Target
Activities of Programmable Nucleases Including CRISPR-Cas9, 38 MOLECULES & CELLS
475, 475–78 (2015).
125. Shengdar Q. Tsai & J. Keith Joung, Defining and Improving the Genome-Wide
Specificities of CRISPR-Cas9 Nucleases, 17 NATURE REVIEWS: GENETICS 300, 300 (2016).
126. CHRISTOPHER THOMAS SCOTT, STEM CELL NOW: FROM THE EXPERIMENT THAT
SHOOK THE WORLD TO THE NEW POLITICS OF LIFE 6–9, 123–30 (2006).
127. Ma et al., supra note 116, at 414–17.
128. In May 2018, the FDA put a hold on CRISPR Therapeutics Phase I/II clinical trial
for sickle-cell disease. Emily Mullin, FDA Halts One of the First Human CRISPR Studies
Before
It
Begins,
MIT
TECH.
REV.
(May
30,
2018,
7:02
PM),
https://www.technologyreview.com/the-download/611271/fda-halts-one-of-the-first-humancrispr-studies-before-it-begins/ [https://perma.cc/9LCQ-AXFR].
129. GeMCRIS,
NAT’L
INSTITUTES
HEALTH,
http://gemcris.od.NIH.gov
[https://perma.cc/5978-XNXK]. The RAC is a federal advisory committee that provides
recommendations to the Director of the NIH related to basic and clinical research involving
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules, including new genome-editing
technologies. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 282(b)(16) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-16); NAT’L
INSTS. OF HEALTH, CHARTER: RECOMBINANT DNA ADVISORY COMMITTEE (2017),
https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/RAC_Charter_2017_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/
87HN-35YF]. Recently, health officials announced plans to do away with the RAC’s genetherapy oversight function. See Francis S. Collins & Scott Gottlieb, The Next Phase of
Human Gene-Therapy Oversight, 379 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1393, 1395 (2018).
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cells.130 Prior to its diminishment, the RAC database listed eleven geneediting protocols: one concerning CRISPR, seven for ZFNs, and none
for TALENs.131 Another database that may provide clues as to the
trials and vectors being used for gene editing are investigational new
drug applications (“INDs”) filed with the FDA.132 For gene-editing
trials to cure inherited diseases, the FDA has approved several INDs
for leukemia, using lentiviral vectors, and β-thalassemia, using AAVs.
At the same time, the FDA has placed “clinical holds” on other sickle
cell and Duchenne muscular dystrophy programs using AAVs.133 The
FDA, meanwhile, has approved gene therapies for retinal blindness—
Luxturna, an AAV therapy—and two products for leukemia, one using
lentiviruses and the other using retroviruses.134
Beyond these resources are listings of clinical trials currently being
conducted, mainly housed at NIH’s Clinical Trials website.135 Simple
keyword searches yield twenty-four CRISPR trials (thirteen in China,

130. See Collins & Gottlieb, supra note 129, at 1395 (announcing the new policy). While
U.S. law prohibits the RAC from considering and the NIH from funding trials that would
edit the germline (i.e., eggs and sperm) to make an edited trait heritable, it does review
editing experiments in somatic cells. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L.
No. 114-113, § 749, 129 Stat. 2242, 2283 (2015).
131. See GeMCRIS, supra note 129.
132. IND Activity, USDA, https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/
HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/DrugandBiologicApprovalReports/INDActivityR
eports/default.htm [https://perma.cc/J92T-MNS9].
133. See Jorge Mansilla-Soto et al., Cell and Gene Therapy for the Beta-Thalassemias:
Advances and Prospects, 27 HUM. GENE THERAPY 295, 296–97 (2016); Sherkow et al., supra
note 79, at 7 (discussing the leukemia approvals); Meghana Keshavan, FDA Slaps Clinical
Hold on Seattle Genetics After Four Patients Die in Cancer Drug Trial, STAT (Dec. 27,
2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/12/27/fda-seattle-genetics-patient-deaths/ [https://perma.cc/
JMJ9-D76R]; Kate Sheridan, Sarepta Halts Early-Stage Gene Therapy Trial for DMD, STAT
(July 25, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/07/25/sarepta-clinical-gene-therapy-dmd/
[https://perma.cc/8BE7-VSGF].
134. Approved Cellular and Gene Therapy Products: Kymriah (tisagenlecleucel), USDA,
https://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/CellularGeneTherapyProducts/ApprovedPr
oducts/ucm573706.htm [https://perma.cc/4EM4-9GQX]; Approved Cellular and Gene
Therapy Products: Luxturna, USDA, https://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/
CellularGeneTherapyProducts/ApprovedProducts/ucm589507.htm [https://perma.cc/YA9HQYM3]; Approved Cellular and Gene Therapy Products: Yescarta (axicabtagene ciloleucel),
USDA,
https://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/CellularGeneTherapyProducts/
ApprovedProducts/ucm581222.htm [https://perma.cc/4QDY-W2AX].
135. CLINICALTRIALS.GOV, https://clinicaltrials.gov [https://perma.cc/K4S3-9SBF].
Simply because a trial appears on a U.S. federal registry, however, does not mean it is
subject to or has passed ethical and regulatory oversight in the United States. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 282(j) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-16) (requiring registration of all
applicable clinical trials).
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ten in the United States, and one in Germany);136 two TALENs studies
(both in China);137 and fourteen ZFN trials (ten in the United States,
three in China, and one in Australia).138 In the last case, it is interesting
to note that China is taking an aggressive approach to developing
CRISPR therapies, while the United States seems to be exhibiting
more caution.139 Whether this is due to safety concerns related to
vectors or intellectual property issues regarding ZFNs as a firstgeneration editing platform remains unclear. Finally, NIH requires all
funded academic and research institutions to review all experiments
involving human subjects through Institutional Review Boards
(“IRBs”).140 How these IRBs will assess safety issues related to vectors
is also an open question. Will they equate the risks of the gene-editing
protocols themselves with the risks—and tragic outcomes—seen by
early iterations of their vectors? Advances in the technology may have
shifted the risk-benefit profile of gene-editing technologies, but
memories of their failures are long and poignant.141 As with mines in
the Gold Rush, there is no single hand to police the safety of geneediting vectors.142 But more information about their mechanisms seems
better than less.

136. Search Results: CRISPR, CLINICALTRIALS.GOV, https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/
results?cond=&term=CRISPR&cntry=&state=&city=&dist= [http://perma.cc/4ZNS-TZR2
(staff-uploaded archive)].
137. Search Results: Talen, CLINICALTRIALS.GOV, https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/
results?cond=&term=talen&cntry=&state=&city=&dist= [https://perma.cc/2A9H-3VRA].
138. Search Result: Zinc Finger, CLINICALTRIALS.GOV, https://clinicaltrials.gov/
ct2/results?term=%22zinc+finger%22&Search=Apply&recrs=b&recrs=a&recrs=f&recrs=
d&recrs=m&age_v=&gndr=&type=&rslt= [http://perma.cc/6ZTQ-T4KG (staff-uploaded
archive)].
139. See NASEM, HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 29, at 41 (“[I]n vitro research
on embryos has already proceeded in China (using nonviable embryos).”).
140. See Carol A. Heimer & JuLeigh Petty, Bureaucratic Ethics: IRBs and the Legal
Regulation of Human Subjects Research, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 601, 602 (2010)
(discussing the NIH’s IRB requirement).
141. Compare Collins & Gottlieb, supra note 129, at 1395 (announcing that advances in
“the general framework for medical product safety” are “well suited” to gene-editing
research), with NASEM, HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 29, at 7 (“It would be
essential for this research to be approached with caution, and for it to proceed with broad
public input.”).
142. See Daniel Cornford, “We All Live More Like Brutes than Humans”: Labor and
Capital in the Gold Rush, in A GOLDEN STATE: MINING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN GOLD RUSH CALIFORNIA 78, 91 (James J. Rawls & Richard J. Orsi eds., 1999) (noting
that individuals, not the government or employers, owed responsibility for mine safety).
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II. THE GENE-EDITING VECTOR PICK-AND-SHOVEL PLAY
A. Secrecy in Pick-and-Shovel Plays
Today, a pick-and-shovel business simply means “a company that
sells products needed for a larger, overarching industry to operate.”143
Businesses that sell pressurized tanks for the storage of natural gas, for
example, provide “picks and shovels” to the otherwise highly volatile
natural gas industry.144 Internet server storage and processing—
Amazon Web Services, for example—sells pick-and-shovel equipment
and services to internet companies.145 And industrial manufacturers of
chemicals—needed for a host of industries—could also be considered
pick-and-shovel operations.146 In finance, pick-and-shovel businesses
are widely believed to be safe if not profitable investments as long as
the overarching technology is commonly used and there is a constant
demand for materials and know-how to implement it.147
This rather mundane sector of business operations belies a more
canny history of its namesake’s origins—and why, of all pieces of
equipment, picks and shovels are tools after which it is named. In 1848,
near Sutter’s Mill, California, Samuel Brannan—newspaper publisher,
Mormon exile, and general store owner—noticed that workers from a
nearby sawmill were keen to purchase Brannan’s mining equipment.148
After pressing them as to their interest, one teamster produced a
pocket of gold dust found at Coloma on the American River outside of
Sacramento.149 At that moment, Brannan seized on an idea, one of the
greatest singular acts of capitalistic zeal in American history: he would
simultaneously publicize the existence of gold in the Coloma-Lotus
Valley and, owning the only store for dozens of miles around, sell the
equipment needed to pan it.150 Brannan commissioned several letters
143. Stutman, supra note 11.
144. Picks and Shovels for Natural Gas: These 3 Companies Will Make Money, SEEKING
ALPHA (Apr. 20, 2012, 11:53 AM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/513861-picks-andshovels-for-natural-gas-these-3-companies-will-make-money [https://perma.cc/PSZ5-VJLY].
145. James Barnes, What’s Your Pick-and-Shovel Play of 2017?, MEDIUM (Sept. 26,
2017), https://medium.com/@JamesBarnesEsq/whats-your-pick-and-shovel-play-of-20175a7c3a594e87 [https://perma.cc/FP92-GM6U].
146. Kraft, supra note 12.
147. See Stutman, supra note 11 (“[I]nternal component providers are the foundation of
everything you see and experience on the surface. Without them, the industry simply
wouldn’t exist, which makes them incredibly secure from the standpoint of demand.”).
148. Watson, supra note 13, at 299.
149. Id.
150. Bringhurst, supra note 14, at 145 (“Before Brannan allowed word of the discovery
to leak out, the enterprising businessman scoured northern California purchasing and
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to the editor in newspapers around the United States about the gold
find and California’s mild climate—“the forerunner of all California
promotion literature.”151 And, later, as business picked up, Brannan
“[r]ush[ed] into San Francisco’s Plaza[,] . . . doffed his broad-brimmed
black hat, and holding aloft a bottle of glittering particles in his left
hand, he bellowed in his great bull voice: ‘GOLD! GOLD! GOLD!
From the American River!’ The Gold Rush was born that instant.”152
Back at his store, Brannan purchased cheap metal pans from every
possible retailer and wholesaler in the United States.153 Retailing for
20¢ each, Brannan sold them to desperate miners for $15 dollars.
Miners, not knowing where else to buy the necessary equipment for
their endeavors, gladly paid.154 At the operation’s peak, Brannan was
netting “$150,000 a month in business”—$4.8 million today.155 Brannan
quickly became the richest man in California, purchasing virtually all
of Calistoga, California; funding the Mexican Revolution of 1860; and,
in a tale apt for a story about the Gold Rush, dying “a penniless
drunkard—shunned by his former friends and forgotten by his
enemies.”156 All from selling picks and shovels.
There are many good lessons to be learned from Brannan’s tale
about marketing, pricing, and cornering a hot market. But like
Brannan’s knowledge about wholesalers of mining equipment, at the
core of most good pick-and-shovel plays lies secrecy.157 If miners
possessed the same knowledge as Brannan on where to purchase tin
pans, Brannan would not have been able to sell them at a 7400%
markup.
This axiom is instructive about the relationship between modernday pick-and-shovel companies and secrecy. Older theories of the firm
stocking his store with any and all merchandise of any conceivable use to the gold seekers.”).
Indeed, prior to Brannan’s announcement, “it was not the social custom [in California] for
miners to share information of a gold strike.” Douglas W. Allen, Information Sharing
During the Klondike Gold Rush, 67 J. ECON. HIST. 944, 961 (2007). Interestingly, Douglas
W. Allen chalks up the difference between information sharing during the California and
Klondike gold rushes to the absence and presence, respectively, of institutionalized property
norms. Id. at 946–47.
151. Watson, supra note 13, at 300.
152. Id. at 301.
153. MARTIN, supra note 13, at 21 n.9.
154. See id.
155. Bringhurst, supra note 14, at 145; see also U.S. Inflation Rate, $150,000 in 1848 to
2018, CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR, https://www.officialdata.org/1848-dollars-in2018?amount=150000 [https://perma.cc/RV5A-SLNU].
156. Bringhurst, supra note 14, at 140.
157. See supra note 10.
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suggest that the size and cohesiveness of a company is defined by
transaction costs.158 But in truth, these costs have as much to do with
tacit knowledge—know-how—as price efficiency.159 In this sense, pickand-shovel plays are forms of “informational arbitrage”: keeping secret
information developed from one source to use it more profitably on
another source.160 This is analogous to the most classic form of
arbitrage, currency arbitrage, where sellers purchase currency from
one market and sell it in another, taking advantage of a difference in
price across markets.161 In some circumstances, the same applies to
physical goods that are both standardized and resalable: oil, precious
metals, and even corn may be utilized for “physical arbitrage.”162 But
in all of these cases, the core of arbitrage remains secrecy: once
information about price differences becomes public knowledge, sellers
demand higher prices, purchasers demand lower prices, and
competitors drive profit margins to efficiency levels, i.e., close to zero.
For this reason, “arbitrageurs do not share all their knowledge with
investors, and cultivate secrecy to protect their knowledge from
imitation.”163 So do vector developers.
B.

The Pick-and-Shovel Play, Gene-Editing Vectors, and Patents

Like tin pans, natural gas storage, or cloud computing resources,
the business of gene-editing vectors constitutes a form of the pick-andshovel play. Developers of gene-editing vectors provide tools,
resources, and a great deal of technical know-how to companies more
concerned with developing gene therapies than the viruses and

158. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 394–95 (1937).
159. Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and
Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503, 1545 (2012)
(“In light of market failure, organizational integration emerges as a viable option for
conveying tacit knowledge, even in the presence of patents.”).
160. See Chau et al., supra note 10, at 2–3 (defining “informational arbitrage”).
161. Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 10, at 35–36.
162. See, e.g., Andrew Coleman, Storage, Transport and the Law of One Price: Theory
with Evidence from Nineteenth Century U.S. Corn Markets, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 332,
332 (2009); André Plourde & G.C. Watkins, Crude Oil Prices Between 1985 and 1994: How
Volatile in Relation to Other Commodities?, 20 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 245, 247
(1998).
163. Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 10, at 40; see also Anokhin & Wincent, supra note 10,
at 440 n.6 (“[E]ffective information exchange may even be purposefully sabotaged by
innovator firms that try to exploit the better resource combinations by pursuing a
‘monopolistic excess of price over cost.’”).
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liposomes packaging their breakthroughs.164 And like Brannan himself,
gene-editing vector companies advertise their wares through
promotional literature and conference presentations, to be sure, but
also through patents.165
Patents, among other forms of advertising, allow vector companies
to disclose their technology to others while, like Brannan, fending off
competition.166 But these disclosures are often incomplete, providing
just enough information about the vector’s basic contours to
understand them but not enough to move the technology in-house.167
It is true that this seems to violate patent law’s statutory requirement
that inventions must be sufficiently disclosed in patent specifications to
enable others to “make and use the same.”168 Also true: this double
protection runs against the maxim that inventors must choose between
protecting their inventions through patents or trade secrets, but not
both.169 But, as scholars have long noted, patent law’s disclosure
requirement is increasingly honored only in the breach,170 and
“layering” patent protection with trade secrecy—the mutually
164. See, e.g., Nicole Faust, Addressing the Challenges of Commercial-Scale Viral Vector
Production, 4 CELL & GENE THERAPY INSIGHTS 31, 31–32 (2018) (describing the services
provided by viral developer CEVEC).
165. E.g., Press Release, CEVEC, CEVEC Intensifies Its Marketing Activities,
Presenting at Various Renowned Scientific Conferences in Europe and the US (Feb. 22,
2016),
https://cevec.com/news/press-releases/cevec-intensifies-its-marketing-activities/
[https://perma.cc/Q8KZ-6GGC]; About Us, supra note 24; Gene Therapy: Intellectual
Property, supra note 22; see also Jason Rantanen & Sarah E. Jack, Patents as Credentials,
WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1–4), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3013780 [http://perma.cc/MP6N-7UV3] (discussing the
reputational incentives behind patenting and patent advertising).
166. Anderson, supra note 36, at 1593 (“Companies use their patents as a type of
advertising, extolling the virtues of a product or company.”); Ann Bartow, Separating
Marketing Innovation from Actual Invention: A Proposal for a New, Improved, Lighter, and
Better-Tasting Form of Patent Protection, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 3 (2000)
(“[P]atents may be good marketing tools (irrespective of the specific inventions they
define), they may enhance the image of the patenting entity (creating an aura of creativity
and technological proficiency), and they may add fiber to patent portfolios.”); Dan L. Burk,
Patent Silences, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1603, 1627 (2016) (“Some view [a patent] as a marketing
asset or as an advertising feature.”).
167. See Burk, supra note 166, at 1628 (“[P]atent doctrine preserves multiple spaces in
which patents remain[] silent, maintaining ambiguities that may be satisfied or imbued with
meanings as needed at different points in the life of the document. The patent provides a
natural point of mediation, which largely occurs in the interstices between the local
meanings of the document’s disclosure.”); Lee, supra note 159, at 1545.
168. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
169. See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Secrecy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1769, 1774
(2016) (“Inventors face a stark choice between two intellectual property systems of
protecting innovative ideas: patents and trade secrecy.”).
170. See id. at 1781–83.
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exclusive nature of the two protections notwithstanding—seems to be
the modern state of affairs.171
For vector developers, the layering of patenting with trade secrecy
provides developers with a higher quantum of protection than either
patents or pure secrecy would alone: insufficiently disclosed patents,
without a primer to the technology’s know-how, are unlikely to attract
high prices or attention.172 Nor are they likely to require the continual
reengagement of the patent-holding firm.173 Perfectly disclosed patents,
meanwhile, are likely to be victims of their own success by informing
potential purchasers how to invent around them. And secrecy alone is
unlikely to assuage potential purchasers’ fears of the patented
technology’s replicability or reliability.174 Patents in this sense operate
as a form of informational arbitrage: informational assets obtained
through the company’s own research that, although disclosed, are
nonetheless restricted to command higher prices elsewhere.175
Take, for example, uniQure’s Vector Delivery System.176 By its
own account, uniQure makes a “modular technology platform”
utilizing AAVs that in theory could be used with virtually any
therapeutic gene cassette desired by licensed developers, such as
Bristol-Myers Squibb.177 To encourage developers to partner with it,
uniQure discloses substantial aspects of its system both through its
patents and through investor and partner communications.178 For
example, uniQure has patented methods of using its technology in

171. Id. at 1774 n.21; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 491–92
(1974) (noting that patent protection does not readily conflict with—nor preempt—state
law patent protections). At the same time, there is the possibility that the “tying” of a slate
of products protected by both trade secrets and patents may be violative of the antitrust
laws; that is, simply, outside the scope of this Article.
172. See Lee, supra note 159, at 1545.
173. See infra Section IV.C.
174. See infra Section IV.B.
175. Cf. Anokhin & Wincent, supra note 10, at 439 (describing this in the context of
informational arbitrage based on technical knowledge); Gray, supra note 10, at 4
(“According to efficient market logic, the rational arbitrager should act alone, drive the
price to the fundamental level, and reap all the rewards of the arbitrage he has found.”
(internal citation omitted)).
176. uniQure’s Technology, supra note 21.
177. Id.; About: Partners, UNIQURE, http://www.uniqure.com/about/partners.php
[https://perma.cc/FEN2-SZAN].
178. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 9,988,645 (disclosing a method of AAV preparation); U.S.
Patent No. 9,885,022 (disclosing another method of AAV preparation); U.S. Patent No.
9,840,694 (disclosing a method of AAV purification); Investors & Newsroom: Events &
Presentations, UNIQURE, http://uniqure.com/investors-newsroom/events-presentations.php
[https://perma.cc/D4A9-9K5F] (listing uniQure’s investor communications).
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certain cell lines and further advertises its system as using one specific
AAV variant—AAV5—that uniQure claims is more effective than
other technologies.179 But a substantial quantity of information about
uniQure’s manufacturing and development processes remains
unknown such that gene-editing companies interested in using
uniQure’s technology have little choice but to partner with the
company directly.180 These gaps in the information disclosed by
uniQure include the sequences of uniQure’s AAV5 construct itself—
important in assessing various safety aspects of uniQure’s platform.181
MaxCyte is another vector company that markets a “patented,
high-performance cell-engineering platform” for the development of
various aspects of gene therapy.182 According to MaxCyte, their
“platform offers the potential to deliver therapy to the patient in a
fraction of the time with less complexity of other autologous [chimeric
antigen T-cells (“CAR-T”)] products . . . due to a more streamlined
manufacturing process without the complexity of virus-based
products.”183
MaxCyte’s
patents,
meanwhile,
disclose
an
electroporation technique using stably transfected mRNA, rather than
DNA, to express the recombinant proteins needed to engage in CART work.184 One would be forgiven, therefore, for thinking that such
patents sufficiently disclosed MaxCyte’s technology to potential
licensees. But MaxCyte’s patents elide over important details such as
sequence listings and manufacturing details of its electroporation

179. Gene Therapy: Hemophilia, UNIQURE, http://uniqure.com/gene-therapy/
hemophilia.php [https://perma.cc/3SEJ-RS7Y] (“We believe these factors contribute to
making AAV5 a potential best-in-class vector for delivering gene therapies more effectively
and safely to a greater portion of patients in need of treatment.”).
180. UNIQURE N.V., supra note 23, at 16 (“[S]ignificant aspects of the process by which
we manufacture our gene therapies are based on unpatented trade secrets and know-how.
We seek to protect our proprietary technology and processes and obtain and maintain
ownership of certain technologies, in part, through confidentiality agreements and invention
assignment agreements with our employees, consultants, scientific advisors, contractors and
commercial collaborator[s].”).
181. See Irene Gil-Farina et al., Improving AAV Gene Therapy Safety Analysis:
Multiplex LAM-PCR Provide New Insights into AAV Vector Integration, 23 MOLECULAR
THERAPY (SUPP. 1) S264, S264 (2015) (cataloging some AAV5 safety issues).
182. About Us, supra note 24.
183. CARMA Platform, MAXCYTE, https://www.maxcyte.com/car/car-platform/
[https://perma.cc/H3SK-GXM2].
184. U.S. Patent No. 9,669,058 (“Certain embodiments involve the use of
electroporation to facilitate the entry of one or more nucleic acid molecules into cells of the
immune system, such as natural killer (NK) cells.”).
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technologies.185 This is, of course, proprietary information, allowing
MaxCyte to advertise its product as “patented” even while failing to
disclose precisely how it works.
Spark Therapeutics provides yet another example of a genetherapy company wishing to establish itself at the forefront of “vector
design,” the DNA sequences that enable vectors to operate safely and
permanently.186 To demonstrate their vector’s potential to licensees,
Spark chose perhaps an unorthodox route: it sought and received FDA
approval for a gene-therapy product of its own, Luxturna, an AAV
therapy indicated to treat a rare form of genetic blindness.187 In an
effort to further entice and inform partners, Spark has filed several
pending patent applications describing components of its vector
technology.188 But regulatory filings note that Spark also quietly makes
use of a trade-secreted platform, Selecta Biosciences’ SVP platform, to
ensure the safety of Spark’s vectors.189 These are critical for Spark’s
vector technology: Selecta’s SVP platform is designed to mitigate the
potential for overactive immune responses to the viral vector used by
Spark, lessening the likelihood that patients suffer extreme—and in
some cases fatal—immune attacks.190 Precisely how such technology
works with Spark’s platform, however, is unknown despite the FDA’s
approval of Luxturna and Spark’s patents seemingly disclosing its
technology.191
These lacunae in vector developers’ patents and technical
disclosures are significant given the recent, almost insatiable interest in
gene editing; not much information is needed to froth investor interest

185. See, e.g., id. (claiming methods of modifying certain cells with mRNA, without
disclosing specific mRNA sequences); U.S. Patent No. 9,132,153 (same); U.S. Patent No.
8,450,112 (same).
186. See BioSci Capital Partners, Rounds Report: Spark Therapeutics Ironically Topped
Our Featured List Despite Its Depreciation, SEEKING ALPHA (Aug. 8, 2016),
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4196276-rounds-report-spark-therapeutics-ironically-toppedfeatured-list-despite-depreciation [https://perma.cc/UA8J-FS8M] (“The company is
leveraging on the cutting-edge viral vector design via adeno-associated virus.”).
187. Luxturna, supra note 134.
188. U.S. Patent Application No. 20,180,135,097 (filed Nov. 7, 2017); U.S. Patent
Application No. 20,170,216,408 (filed Mar. 17, 2017).
189. Selecta Biosciences, Inc., supra note 26, at 47; Spark Therapeutics, Inc., supra note
26, at 19.
190. SVP™ for Immune Tolerance, SELECTA BIOSCIENCES, http://selectabio.com/
platform/svp-for-immune-tolerance/ [https://perma.cc/A7PR-AMCE].
191. See Spark Therapeutics, Inc., supra note 26, at 19.
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and massage fears of past failures.192 The vector-platform industry has
responded to this demand by touting efforts to develop a new
generation of vectors with better efficacy, higher potency, and reduced
integration problems.193 In developing g-RVs, for example, industry
efforts included removing sequences that would detrimentally activate
nearby genes.194 This was an important first step in the field; later
studies showed that these so-called self-inactivating (“SIN”) viruses
improved safety in SCID therapy.195 At the same time, the possibility
that SIN g-RVs could integrate into promoter regions of genes
provided the impetus for the development of a different type of gene
ferry, lentiviral vectors (“LVs”).196 LVs do not readily integrate in
nearby genes, thus reducing the probability of “insertional
mutagenesis”—the mutation of genes through the accidental
“insertion” of the vector’s payload.197 Newly engineered versions of
LVs are, in theory, transcriptionally inactive; many are used in some
ongoing gene-therapy trials.198 And AAVs have perhaps become the
most widely used gene-therapy interventions to date with over 173
clinical trials recorded in 2017 alone.199 As with Spark’s use of Selecta’s
SVP platform, however, host immune response to AAVs remains a
major obstacle.200 Finally, CAR-T therapies, using retroviral vectors in
an ex vivo setting, have emerged as a potential treatment for malignant
cancers.201 And even despite some fatal failures in the CAR-T

192. See Max Nisen, Playing with Crispr, Investors Get Burned, BLOOMBERG (June 13,
2018, 4:21 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-06-11/crispr-gene-editingsetback-offers-reminder-of-biotech-risks [https://perma.cc/5YKW-ZSBT (dark archive)].
193. Naldini, supra note 39, at 351.
194. S. Hacein-Bey-Abina et al., A Modified γ-Retrovirus Vector for X-Linked Severe
Combined Immunodeficiency, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1407, 1407–08 (2014).
195. Id. at 1408.
196. See NASEM, HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 29, at 225 (discussing
integrase-defective lentiviral vectors); Shim et al., supra note 9, at 744 fig.4.
197. Melissa A. Kotterman, Thomas W. Chalberg & David V. Schaffer, Viral Vectors for
Gene Therapy: Translational and Clinical Outlook, 17 ANN. REV. BIOMEDICAL
ENGINEERING 63, 65–68 (2015). To be clear, naturally occurring LVs do carry the risk of
insertional mutagenesis, but this is likely due to a single virally encoded gene, integrase,
that, once removed, strongly mitigates this effect. Id. at 67–68.
198. See Daniela Cesana et al., Uncovering and Dissecting the Genotoxicity of SelfInactivating Lentiviral Vectors In Vivo, 22 MOLECULAR THERAPY 774, 774 (2014).
199. DiCarlo et al., supra note 9, at 15.
200. Roberto Calcedo & James M. Wilson, Humoral Immune Response to AAV, 4
FRONTIERS IMMUNOLOGY, no. 341, Oct. 18, 2013, at 1, 1; Nelson & Gersbach, supra note
9, at 646–47.
201. Yin et al., supra note 9, at 391–92.
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space202—the equivalent of a mine collapse, if you will—CAR-T
development rapidly continues, with Gilead acquiring Kite
Pharmaceuticals203 and Novartis also investing heavily in the
technology.204 Like early advertisements for the Gold Rush, the
potential for vectors’ success seems to paint a much rosier picture than
can be readily ascertained from patents’ literature. And advertisements
of safety, efficacy, and potential treatment and cures, as we have
learned from other frontier biotechnologies, raise significant bioethical
concerns.
III. BIOETHICS OF VECTOR PICK-AND-SHOVEL PLAYS
This combination of patents and the pick-and-shovel play in the
gene-editing vector space raises several specific ethical issues. Vector
patents’ partial technical disclosures add uncertainty to patients’ and
research subjects’ medical risk, especially for viral vectors. It also
perpetuates risky clinical trials on shaky foundations of preclinical
evidence. The vector pick-and-shovel play also complicates issues of
informed consent between patients and clinicians. And assuming
therapies are approved by the FDA using a partially secretive vector
as a backbone, this may ultimately drive up costs, exacerbating access
and affordability issues currently plaguing advanced therapies.205
Vector developers’ employment of pick-and-shovel strategies may be
good for business, but they stand counter to some core principles of
bioethics.

202. DeFrancesco, supra note 110, at 6; Roni Dengler, Cancer Immunotherapy Company
Tries to Explain Deaths in Recent Trial, SCIENCE (Nov. 16, 2017, 5:45 PM),
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/11/cancer-immunotherapy-company-tries-explain-deathsrecent-trial [https://perma.cc/P5SG-3672]; Keshavan, supra note 133; Levine, supra note 28;
Rebecca Robbins, Patient Dies from Severe Brain Swelling After Taking Kite’s CAR-T
Therapy, STAT (May 8, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/05/08/patient-dies-kite-cart-therapy/ [https://perma.cc/9FQQ-S3HP]; Mark Terry, Patient Dies in Cellectis’
Groundbreaking CAR-T Trial, Forcing a Halt to Trials, BIOSPACE (Sept. 11, 2017),
https://www.biospace.com/article/patient-dies-in-cellectis-groundbreaking-car-t-trial-forcinga-halt-to-trials-/ [https://perma.cc/BT9Z-TN3T] [hereinafter Terry, Patient Dies].
203. Press Release, Gilead Sciences, Inc., Gilead Completes Acquisition of Kite Pharma,
https://www.gilead.com/news-and-press/company-statements/kite-pharma [https://perma.cc/
29R3-WRT2].
204. See DeFrancesco, supra note 110, at 6.
205. See Scott & DeFrancesco, supra note 9, at 606.
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A. Uncertain Risk
Any human testing of a new medical technology has inherent
risk.206 But with enough technical information about the technology
itself, such risk can—at least ideally—be quantified and managed.207
Typically, clinicians engage in such analyses by using empirical data to
assess the clinical effectiveness of a given intervention and weigh that
effectiveness against the potential harm by treatment.208 This requires
some detailed knowledge about the mechanism of the intervention
itself; it is difficult to quantify a treatment’s potential risk if it is unclear
how the treatment works.209 Failures to appreciate the molecular
mechanisms behind certain treatments have led to spectacular failures
in medicine.210
Partial and incomplete technical disclosures for certain geneediting vectors—in combination with their adoption by the field—
makes the risk of many potential gene-editing therapies uncertain.
Those advising potential clinical trial subjects may not know in which
cell lines the subject vectors are produced, important for
immunogenicity studies.211 If the sequence of the vector is unknown,
clinicians may similarly be unaware of the risks of oncogenic genomic
206. See, e.g., M.J.H. Kenter & A.F. Cohen, Establishing Risk of Human
Experimentation with Drugs: Lessons from TGN1412, 368 LANCET 1387, 1387 (2006)
(“Administration of a chemical or biological compound to a human being is never without
risk.”).
207. See A. Brett Hauber, Angelyn O. Fairchild & F. Reed Johnson, Quantifying
Benefit–Risk Preferences for Medical Interventions: An Overview of a Growing Empirical
Literature, 11 APPLIED HEALTH ECONS. & HEALTH POL’Y 319, 319, 325 (2013)
(mentioning technology as but one factor used to elicit benefit-risk preferences).
208. Id. at 320.
209. See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419,
458–60 (2015) (describing this principle in the context of “black box” algorithmic diagnostic
tests).
210. See, e.g., Waqas Rehman, Lisa M. Arfons & Hillard M. Lazarus, The Rise, Fall and
Subsequent Triumph of Thalidomide: Lessons Learned in Drug Development, 2
THERAPEUTIC ADVANCES HEMATOLOGY 291, 291, 294–95 (2011) (noting that the
thalidomide disaster arose, in part, from a lack of understanding of the drug’s mechanism
of action).
211. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Audsley & Gregory A. Tannock, Cell-Based Influenza
Vaccines, 68 DRUGS 1483, 1486–87 (2008) (noting that GlaxoSmithKline uses a proprietary
cell line for some influenza vaccine development); Jiemiao Hu & Shulin Li, Electroporation
Formulation for Cell Therapy, in ELECTROPORATION PROTOCOLS 55, 57 (Shulin Li et al.
eds., 2014) (“[A]s a trade secret, the components in each [proprietary electroporation]
buffer are unknown, which is inconvenient when researchers try to transfect a new cell
line.”); Ana F. Rodrigues et al., Viral Vaccines and Their Manufacturing Cell Substrates:
New Trends and Designs in Modern Vaccinology, 10 BIOTECHNOLOGY J. 1329, 1336 (2015)
(recounting the history of PER.C6, the first proprietary “designer-cell substrate”).
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integration.212 And if organ tropism is unknown—such as selective
integration in the liver—this may increase organ toxicity in patients
with already-damaged immune systems.213 This makes granular risk
assessments—other than “kill or cure”—all but impossible.214
This can be seen from a recent reset of the vector-design field that
has experienced both startling successes and catastrophic failures. At
the same hospital in France where X-linked SCID trials occurred
nearly twenty years ago, clinicians recently transplanted engineered
stem cells and apparently “cured” a teenager with sickle cell disease.215
An in vivo trial using an AAV vector has similar effects on six of seven
patients with severe Hemophilia A.216 And a 2018 β-thalassemia trial
using LV-engineered stem cells reduced or stopped the need for blood
transfusions in all twenty-two patients.217
At the same time, issues concerning vectors and manufacturing—
the bulk of which remain trade secrets despite being patented—are
likely responsible for a spate of deaths in trials advancing CAR-T.218 A
gene-therapy trial sponsored by Juno Therapeutics resulted in the
deaths of five clinical trial subjects, all from toxicities likely related to
the treatment itself.219 While the ultimate cause of such toxicities
remains unclear, the likely culprit stems from a portion of the vector
construct used to create Juno’s therapy—something called the
costimulatory domain.220 Cellectis, another company developing
212. See, e.g., Axel Schambach et al., Biosafety Features of Lentiviral Vectors, 24 HUM.
GENE THERAPY 132, 133 (2013) (discussing the need to thoroughly understand the
sequence of g-RVs to assess safety).
213. See Takehiro Ura, Kenji Okuda & Masaru Shimada, Developments in Viral VectorBased Vaccines, 2 VACCINES 624, 624 (2014).
214. See Scott & DeFrancesco, supra note 9, at 600 (“Ex vivo γ-Moloney murine
leukemia RV-mediated transfer of the γc-chain cDNA (common to several interleukin
receptors) to autologous [hematopoietic stem cells] cured boys with X-linked SCID.
However, four of ten children and one of ten children in a similar UK trial developed
leukemia.”).
215. Jean-Antoine Ribeil et al., Gene Therapy in a Patient with Sickle Cell Disease, 376
NEW ENG. J. MED. 848, 848–49 (2017).
216. See Savita Rangarajan et al., AAV5-Factor VII Gene Transfer in Severe Hemophilia
A, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2519, 2519 (2017).
217. Alexis A. Thompson et al., Gene Therapy in Patients with Transfusion-Dependent
β-Thalassemia, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1479, 1479 (2018).
218. See supra Section II.B.
219. See DeFrancesco, supra note 110, at 6; Clara Rodríguez Fernández, A Cure for
Cancer? How CAR-T Therapy Is Revolutionizing Oncology, LABIOTECH.EU (Jan. 16,
2018), https://labiotech.eu/features/car-t-therapy-cancer-review/ [https://perma.cc/6X8FBGTU].
220. Fernández, supra note 219; Mark Terry, A Look at the Deaths that Plagued Juno
and Kite Pharma’s CAR-T Trials, BIOSPACE (June 29, 2017), https://www.biospace.com/
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products in the CAR-T space, similarly reported nine deaths from its
trial “not related . . . to disease progression.”221 This is despite robust
patenting from both Juno and Cellectis.222 These trials and travails
underscore how individual disease, different delivery systems, and
gene-transfer technology make the risk-benefit calculation difficult for
these first-in-human trials.223
This uncertainty of risk seems especially problematic in the
context of gene-editing vectors because it allows the benefit side of the
risk-benefit equation to increase while keeping the risk side dark. To
date, gene-editing trials have justifiably focused on last-option patients
with deadly disease.224 As a consequence, there are significant
pressures to translate CRISPR and other gene-editing technologies to
clinical applications—deeper understandings of how they’re
introduced into cells be damned.225 Even with imperfect
understandings of how gene-editing vectors work, this has changed the
risk-benefit ratio for single-gene (i.e., “monogenic”) diseases that seem
potentially curable but are otherwise deadly.226 This is especially true
in developing countries with high health-care burdens, and even in
developed countries, like the United States, with high health-care
costs.227 Marina Cavazzana, head of biotherapy at the Necker Hospital
for Sick Children in Paris where she conducts X-linked SCID trials,
stated that “[i]f one compares the cost of gene therapy to conventional
therapy and transplantation in economic terms, it is absolutely the least

article/a-look-at-the-deaths-that-plagued-juno-and-kite-pharma-s-car-t-trials-/ [https://perma.cc/
9XAH-TZE7] [hereinafter Terry, A Look at the Deaths].
221. See Terry, A Look at the Deaths, supra note 220.
222. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,446,190 (claiming specific CAR-T sequences); U.S.
Patent No. 9,855,297 (claiming certain endonucleases for use in CAR-T preparation); U.S.
Patent No. 9,890,393 (same).
223. See Robbins, supra note 202; Terry, Patient Dies, supra note 202.
224. See NASEM, HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 29, at 47 (“First-in-human
trials make compliance with [informed consent] provisions difficult, given that by definition,
it is very difficult to assess the degree of uncertainty that pertains when research is moving
from preclinical models to human interventions.”).
225. See Nicol et al., supra note 32, at 87.
226. See Luigi Naldini, Ex Vivo Gene Transfer and Correction for Cell-Based Therapies,
12 NATURE REVIEWS: GENETICS 301, 301 (2011) (“[Monogenic diseases treated with]
early-generation retroviral vectors, now provide a comprehensive analysis of a sizeable
number of patients, allowing a reliable assessment of long-term immune system
reconstitution and the risk/benefit ratio . . . . The verdict is favourable, with a clear longterm therapeutic benefit evident in most treated patients despite the occurrence of vectorrelated leukaemia in a few.”).
227. See Stuart H. Orkin & Philip Reilly, Paying for Future Success in Gene Therapy,
352 SCIENCE 1059, 1060 (2016).
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expensive system. It is a cure for patients, with no continued therapy,
no immunosuppression, and no infections.”228 This assumes, of course,
that deadly diseases are viewed as infinitely harmful, and discounts to
zero—because they are unknown—the likely adverse events that may
arise from aggressive treatment using less than well-characterized
vectors.
Patenting and secrecy issues for vectors notwithstanding, perhaps
this calculus is ethically appropriate: Is the promise of the technology
changing or just our perceptions of it? Like the CAR-T example, it is
true that the first trials have killed some patients faster than the
underlying disease otherwise would have. But the trials have also
wonderfully cured others.229 Nonetheless, risk assessments for clinical
trial subjects and patients should not be kept in the shadows. It does
not excuse the hocking of the new technology’s vectors and the
subsequent secreting away of important information about them.
B.

Insufficient Preclinical Evidence

Some of the vector patents’ secrecy gap stems from structural
issues in patent doctrine: patent law’s incentives—if not
requirements—for early patenting.230 Patent law’s novelty
requirement, for example, contains within it a series of “statutory
bars,” prohibitions on developers patenting their own inventions if the
inventions had been disclosed “in a printed publication, or in public
use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public” for more than one
year prior to filing a patent application.231 Beyond this legal
requirement, developers engage in early patenting for traditional
reasons having to do with competitive advantage and defensive
strategy.232
228. See Scott & DeFrancesco, supra note 9, at 606.
229. E.g., Levine, supra note 28.
230. Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J.
65, 93–96 (2009) (describing this phenomenon); Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility
Paradox, supra note 31, at 883–84 (linking this to scientific irreproducibility).
231. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), (b)(1) (2012); Robert P. Merges, Priority and Novelty
Under the AIA, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023, 1024–27 (2012) (discussing the statutory
bars).
232. See, e.g., Stuart J.H. Graham et. al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent
System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1288
(2009) (“[P]atenting plays a substantial role for many high-technology startups in securing
competitive advantage from their technology innovations.”); Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking
Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 944 (2011) (“Savvy third-party patentees
accordingly have an incentive to purposely create novelty hurdles for subsequent inventors
by strategically disclosing unclaimed, unmade compounds in their patents.”); Sean B.
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This means, however, that patents—even at their best—are
frequently grounded in early-stage preclinical evidence, much of which
is unlikely to be replicable.233 For some drugs, this means basing a
patents’ claims on treating human therapy like small-sample-size
animal trials.234 For gene-editing vectors, this means that patents are
similarly filed early, long before any clinical trials have been run.235
Whatever does end up disclosed may ultimately not work as claimed.236
As a result, many of the safety issues arising from vector design are
unlikely to be found out until long after patents have been filed. The
clinical trial deaths from treatment studies obviously came as surprises
to the companies themselves.237 Other problematic safety issues are
likely more predictable, however, such as cellular “chimerism,” tissues
with mixtures of genomic material,238 and off-target effects, changes to
the code of genes not sought to be edited.239 Some of these can be
Seymore, The Null Patent, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2041, 2073 (2012) (“[A] research
organization might engage in defensive publication, which occurs when information ‘[is]
intentionally made available to the public as prior art in order to render any subsequent
claims of invention or discovery ineligible for a patent.’” (second alteration in original)
(quoting STEPHEN A. HANSEN & JUSTIN W. VANFLEET, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK ON ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS IN PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
MAINTAINING BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 24 (2003), https://community-wealth.org/sites/
clone.community-wealth.org/files/downloads/book-hansen-vanFleet.pdf [https://perma.cc/
B7T7-DY7Y])).
233. See generally Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, supra note 31
(exploring this phenomenon with four case studies).
234. E.g., In re ‘318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(criticizing a patent’s basis on animal studies); Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility
Paradox, supra note 31, at 890 (“[T]he basis for the ‘197 patent’s claims rests only on the
thinnest reed of data: a preclinical, prophylactic trial in baboons—and even then, only ten
baboons.”).
235. See U.S. Patent No. 9,132,153 (filed May 24, 2013) (MaxCyte’s Patent); U.S. Patent
No. 8,450,112 (filed Apr. 9, 2009) (same); U.S. Patent No. 9,988,645 (filed Feb. 3, 2017)
(uniQure’s patent); U.S. Patent No. 9,885,022 (filed Nov. 25, 2015) (same); U.S. Patent No.
9,840,694 (filed Sept. 7, 2012) (same); U.S. Patent Application No. 20,180,135,097 (filed
Nov. 7, 2017) (Spark Therapeutics’ patent application); U.S. Patent Application No.
20,170,216,408 (filed Mar. 17, 2017) (same).
236. Cf. Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, supra note 31, at 886–98
(analyzing four case studies of this in the context of small molecule drugs).
237. See Jennifer Couzin-Frankel, Worries, Confusion After Cancer Trial Deaths, 354
SCIENCE 1211, 1211 (2016). One researcher reacted, “Why would we see this now? We don’t
know, period.” Id.
238. See Maria Pia Cicalese & Alessandro Aiuti, Clinical Applications for Gene Therapy
for Primary Immunodeficiencies, 26 HUM. GENE THERAPY 210, 214 (2015) (discussing
safety issues with partial chimerism).
239. A common definition of “off-target effects” is changes to the code of genes not
sought to be edited. See Shim et al., supra note 9, at 747 (noting the risk for unsafe off-target
effects for some vectors).
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especially concerning—some have the propensity to cause cancer and
some cause large deletions of otherwise necessary genes.240
As a consequence, vector developers file for patents covering their
wares before they can reasonably know whether clinical trials will even
be safe.241 This gives vector patents—along with corporate advertising
of their technology’s patent protection—the false imprimatur of good
technological disclosure useful for green lighting clinical trials.242 This
unfortunately traffics on the current framework used for such analyses,
which prioritizes technical disclosures, above all others, as sufficient for
informed consent.243 In 2010, the bioethicist Jonathan Kimmelman
developed a risk-assessment framework for novel gene therapies to
help reviewers and investigators decide when the distance between
preclinical and clinical research is sufficiently narrow to green light a
first-in-human experiment.244 Under this framework, measurements of
scientific validity—such as whether animal data are good
representations of the human condition under study, the level of
disclosures’ experimental reproducibility and replicability, a study’s
statistical power, and tests of the vector platform—can give confidence
to reviewers and oversight committees about whether to proceed.245
Two Canadian researchers, François Baylis and Marcus McLeod,
analyzed a RAC-approved Phase I CRISPR trial for cancer using the
Kimmelman framework.246 Among other major concerns about the
study’s validity, they found that investigators of the study did not

240. Clara Rodríguez Fernández, Scientists Warn CRISPR Therapy Could Cause Cancer
as First Human Trials Take Place, LABIOTECH.EU (Nov. 6, 2018), https://labiotech.eu/
medical/crispr-therapy-cancer-risk/ [https://perma.cc/5BT9-JXLN]; Heidi Ledford,
CRISPR Gene Editing Produces Unwanted DNA Deletions, NATURE (July 16, 2018),
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-05736-3 [https://perma.cc/K8WF-P7MD].
241. See U.S. Patent No. 9,132,153 (filed May 24, 2013) (MaxCyte’s Patent); U.S. Patent
No. 8,450,112 (filed Apr. 9, 2009) (same); U.S. Patent No. 9,988,645 (filed Feb. 3, 2017)
(uniQure’s patent); U.S. Patent No. 9,885,022 (filed Nov. 25, 2015) (same); U.S. Patent No.
9,840,694 (filed Sept. 7, 2012) (same); U.S. Patent Application No. 20,180,135,097 (filed
Nov. 7, 2017) (Spark Therapeutics’ patent application); U.S. Patent Application No.
20,170,216,408 (filed Mar. 17, 2017) (same); see also Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility
Paradox, supra note 31, at 886–98; supra text accompanying notes 235–36.
242. See JONATHAN KIMMELMAN, GENE TRANSFER AND THE ETHICS OF FIRST-INHUMAN RESEARCH: LOST IN TRANSLATION 40 (2010) (criticizing “[t]he tendency in
clinical research and human protections . . . to conceptualize risk in technical, mono-causal
terms”).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 110.
245. Id. at 117–24.
246. Baylis & McLeod, supra note 112, at 311.
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sufficiently test the efficacy of the lentiviral delivery system.247 This led
Baylis and McLeod to conclude that the move to a first-in-human
CRISPR trial using the delivery system was “premature.”248
Nonetheless, the eighteen-patient trial, approved by an academic IRB,
continued to recruit patients.249
To be clear, this rush to the clinic isn’t solely a function of patent
law’s early, incomplete disclosure requirement. Rather, this example
simply illustrates that gene-editing trials using unsafe vectors may—
and frequently do—commence with imperfect or insufficient
preclinical data.250 Yet, patents—touted by vector developers to sell the
novelty of their technologies—seem worse than nothing in their place
in the Baylis-McLeod framework. A useful comparison, perhaps, can
be made to stem cell research. Over the course of a decade or more,
hundreds of patent disclosures complimented by a significant trove of
basic and preclinical research led to greater degrees of certainty as stem
cell interventions moved through trials into the clinic.251 Yet, early
efforts in these areas suffered from ethical lapses, underfunding,
moving too quickly, and, still, insufficient preclinical evidence.252
There, at least, local, national, and international agencies moved
quickly to set standards for clinical research, including emphasis on
preclinical data and strong scientific rationales.253 In turn, the worth of
stem cell patents has been muted.254 But in the case of CRISPR, the
247. Id. at 313.
248. Id. at 317 (“In our view, the move to first-in-human Phase 1 CRISPR gene editing
cancer trials in the United States, on the basis of pre-clinical evidence presented to the RAC,
is premature insofar as it makes the leap of faith a leap too far.”).
249. NY-ESO-1-redirected CRISPR (TCRendo and PD1) Edited T Cells (NYCE T
Cells), CLINICALTRIALS.GOV, https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT03399448 [https://perma.cc/
PAU2-UDMW]. The CRISPR interventional trial, sponsored by the University of
Pennsylvania, uses engineered, autologous T-cells that have been edited to “disrupt
expression” of native TCRα, TCRβ, and PD-1. Id.
250. See Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, supra note 31, at 883–85.
251. SCOTT, supra note 126, at 95–121.
252. George Q. Daley, The Promise and Peril of Stem Cell Therapeutics, 10 CELL STEM
CELL 740, 740 (2012); Christopher Thomas Scott & David Magnus, Wrongful Termination:
Lessons from the Geron Clinical Trial, 3 STEM CELLS TRANSLATIONAL MED. 1398, 1399
(2014).
253. Roger A. Barker et al., The Challenges of First-in-Human Stem Cell Clinical Trials:
What Does This Mean for Ethics and Institutional Review Boards?, 10 STEM CELL REP.
1429, 1429 (2018); George Q. Daley et al., Setting Global Standards for Stem Cell Research
and Clinical Translation: The 2016 ISSCR Guidelines, 6 STEM CELL REP. 778, 778 (2016);
Jonathan Kimmelman & Carole Federico, Consider Drug Efficacy Before First-in-Human
Trials, 542 NATURE 25, 26 (2017).
254. Jacob S. Sherkow & Christopher Thomas Scott, Stem Cell Patents After the America
Invents Act, 16 CELL STEM CELL 461, 463 (2015) (noting that “new administrative
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move to the clinic has come barely five years after the first reported
discoveries and with virtually no attention paid to the enabling half of
the possible therapeutic agents—the vector systems.255 Pick-andshoveling vector patents in this regard risks moving from the bench to
the clinic on an unstable bedrock.
C.

Opacity to Informed Consent

The gene-editing vector pick-and-shovel play presents another
issue concerning patient-subject autonomy: opacity to informed
consent. Transparent and voluntary informed consent is an ethical
cornerstone of medical research.256 Patients should be able to properly
weigh the risks of experimental medicine based on their conversations
with their physicians and make health decisions in line with their values
and goals.257 Subjects of biomedical research, in partnership with their
providers, should similarly decide whether the benefits of seeking an
investigational treatment outweigh the risks.258 For a consent to be
ethical and valid, the patient must be free to make a voluntary decision
based on known and transparent information.259
procedures before the PTO make it substantially easier (and cheaper) to challenge stem cell
patents as they become issued . . . [and that this] may be a natural stage in the life cycle of
any rapidly developing area of law and technology”).
255. Aside from the exhaustive review by Picanço-Castro, de Sousa Russo-Carbolante
and Covas, see supra note 8, we could find no other academic articles assessing disclosures
in gene-editing vector patents.
256. See COUNCIL FOR INT’L ORGS. OF MED. SCIS., INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL
GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS, Guideline 4
(2002) [hereinafter CIOMS GUIDELINES], https://cioms.ch/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/
International_Ethical_Guidelines_for_Biomedical_Research_Involving_Human_Subjects.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9PFT-KTMN] (detailing requirements for “individual informed consent”
in Guideline 4); ICH HARMONISED TRIPARTITE GUIDELINE: GUIDELINE FOR GOOD
CLINICAL PRACTICE E6(R1) 5, 9 (1996) [hereinafter ICH GUIDELINE],
https://www.ich.org/fileadmin/Public_Web_Site/ICH_Products/Guidelines/Efficacy/E6/E6_
R1_Guideline.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EFG-BRW3]; NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT
REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH § C.1 (1979) [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT], https://www.hhs.gov/
ohrp/sites/default/files/the-belmont-report-508c_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B88C-JZ6X];
WORLD MED. ASS’N, WMA DECLARATION OF HELSINKI: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR
MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS ¶¶ 25–32 (2018),
https://www.wma.net/policies-post/wma-declaration-of-helsinki-ethical-principles-for-medicalresearch-involving-human-subjects/ [https://perma.cc/BL5C-3L9Z] (setting out informed
consent guidelines in paragraphs 25–32).
257. CIOMS GUIDELINES, supra note 256, Guideline 4.
258. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 256, § C.2; WORLD MED. ASS’N, supra note 256,
¶¶ 16–18.
259. CIOMS GUIDELINES, supra note 256, Guideline 4.
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But if expert clinicians in the gene-therapy field are proceeding
under a veil of opacity about the vectors used to mediate those
therapies, informed consent turns fraught: How can providers—
without a full understanding of or access to all the available evidence—
properly obtain consent from their patients?260 The pick-and-shovel
play for vector patents makes this especially problematic because it
gives clinicians the appearance of transparency even while information
about vector platforms is intentionally being secreted from trialists.
Even if evidence about the nature of certain vectors could be presented
adequately and clearly, and assuming a subject’s understanding of this
information could be properly assessed, informed consent is still
arguably lacking without full transparency about the delivery systems
themselves.
This opacity to obtaining informed consent arising from the vector
pick-and-shovel play exacerbates several other ethical problems
endemic to modern gene-editing technologies. First, it plays on
patients’ susceptibility to overhyped portrayals of gene-editing
technologies like CRISPR: gene-editing technologies are cures for
genetic illnesses that are cheaper, easier, and more precise than other
therapies.261 Such a view discounts, of course, the uncertainties about
the vectors used to operate them or minimizes the difficulties
encountered during the more than twenty years of refinement of
vector-based gene therapies.262
Second, it contributes to gene editing’s hype. In a series of national
and international policy reports and peer-reviewed research,
bioethicists and policy researchers raised questions about public
understanding of genome editing.263 As a consequence, there is no clear
path for how the public should be engaged to properly develop
260. Motoko Araki & Tetsuya Ishii, Providing Appropriate Risk Information on
Genome Editing for Patients, 34 TRENDS BIOTECHNOLOGY 86, 86, 89 (2016).
261. See Jasanoff et al., supra note 2; cf. Christopher Scott, Treading the Line Between
Sensational and Groundbreaking Science, 15 AM. J. BIOETHICS 1, 1 (2015) (discussing the
merits of publishing experiment results from controversial CRISPR trials prior to
meaningful relevant research).
262. See Naso et al., supra note 39, at 329 (expressing confidence in AAV therapy but
noting that design challenges remain); Nelson & Gersbach, supra note 9, at 654–55 (listing
ongoing challenges with vector technology); Shim et al., supra note 9, at 746–50 (listing
various uncertainties concerning gene-editing safety and efficacy).
263. J. Benjamin Hurlbut, Limits of Responsibility: Genome Editing, Asilomar, and the
Politics of Deliberation, 45 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 11, 11, 13 (2015); Jasanoff et al., supra note
2; Eric T. Juengst, Crowdsourcing the Moral Limits of Human Gene Editing?, 47 HASTINGS
CTR. REP. 15, 15–17 (2017); Carolyn P. Neuhaus & Arthur L. Caplan, Genome Editing:
Bioethics Shows the Way, 15 PLOS BIOLOGY, no. e2001934, Mar. 16, 2017, at 1, 3–5.
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genome-editing policy, a normative value behind most new
technologies.264 How experts and the public should interact on crucial
questions of clinical trials is also an open question.265 As a result,
existing guidance and mechanisms of governance of genome editing
may not adequately reflect public beliefs and values.266 The known and
unknown risks of genome-editing technologies—including the
attendant risks of vector technologies—must be communicated
adequately if governance with public input is to be seriously
considered.267
Third, it contributes to a culture of rational ignorance on the part
of clinicians regarding technical and safety hurdles that must be
surmounted before trials can proceed.268 As discussed previously,
essential to any assessment of risk for first-in-human trials is an
exhaustive evaluation of the preclinical evidence.269 Though new geneediting vectors are often portrayed as a quantum leap over first
generation technologies, several major questions concerning the
technology’s safety even in the preclinical validation phase are still
unresolved.270 The pick-and-shovel play, however, is likely to
contribute to a physician’s determination that such concerns are
unknowable, simply because vector developers have chosen to guard
their platforms as secret.271
D. Increased Costs
Lastly, patents covering important vectors have the ability to—
indeed, the likelihood of—increasing the costs of gene-editing
therapies using them if and when such therapies are marketed. By
264. See Hurlbut, supra note 263, at 13; Jasanoff et al., supra note 2; see also JAMES
WILSDON & REBECCA WILLIS, SEE-THROUGH SCIENCE: WHY PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT
NEEDS TO MOVE UPSTREAM 13–19 (2004) (reviewing the literature on the “[p]ublic
understanding of science”).
265. See, e.g., Juan Pablo Domecq et al., Patient Engagement in Research: A Systematic
Review, 14 BMC HEALTH SERVS. RES., no. 89, Feb. 26, 2014, at 1, 2 (noting that it “remains
unclear who to engage or when, or how to perform this task”).
266. See INT’L BIOETHICS COMM., REPORT OF THE IBC ON UPDATING ITS
REFLECTION ON THE HUMAN GENOME AND HUMAN RIGHTS 27 (2015),
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002332/233258E.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KB2-UQRH];
NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 40, at 86; Editorial, Genome Editing:
Science, Ethics, and Public Engagement, 390 LANCET 625, 625 (2017).
267. See Jasanoff et al., supra note 2.
268. See Edward Lanphier et al., Don’t Edit the Human Germ Line, 519 NATURE 410,
410–11 (2015).
269. See supra Section III.B.
270. See supra notes 233–40 and accompanying text.
271. See supra Section III.A.
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conferring exclusive protection over a particular product—or in the
case of vectors, a component of a larger product—patents give their
owners the ability to charge supracompetitive prices.272 And while this
may sound like more of an economic concern than an ethical one,
prices for life-saving therapies like gene therapies tend to traffic on the
bioethical principle of justice: at the most extreme, patients who cannot
afford gene-editing therapies may die where more well-heeled
sufferers would have otherwise lived.273 On a broader scale, this may
contribute to increasing disparities in health outcomes between the rich
and the poor.274 The vector pick-and-shovel play may, in time, come to
be viewed as taking advantage of the ill just the same as Brannan took
advantage of Sutter’s Fort miners.
Private issues of justice notwithstanding, increased costs
associated with the pick-and-shovel play have public concerns as well.
Increased costs, all else being equal, decrease health-care payers’
bottom lines.275 Classical modeling would suggest this has one of two
effects: either insurance premiums themselves become increasingly
expensive, which in turn has the effect of limiting insurance coverage
(and access to health care), especially among the most price sensitive
of the population;276 or in the context of public payers, lead to health-

272. Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual Property, 91 TEX.
L. REV. 227, 236 (2012) (“Intellectual property . . . allows inventors or creators to charge
supercompetitive prices during the period of exclusivity.”).
273. See Rebecca E. Wolitz, A Corporate Duty to Rescue: Biopharmaceutical Companies
and Access to Medications, 94 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3186418 [https://perma.cc/G6T6-VBAG] (describing high
drug prices as impinging on ethical duties).
274. See Michael Chernew et al., Effects of Increased Patient Cost Sharing on
Socioeconomic Disparities in Health Care, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1131, 1131, 1135
(2008).
275. This is assuming, of course, that payers will be forced to cover these new
technologies but be unable to concomitantly raise premiums. The historical basis for this set
of assumptions was weak in the early 2000s when premiums rose faster than expenditures.
See J.D. Kleinke, The Price of Progress: Prescription Drugs in the Health Care Market, 20
HEALTH AFF. 43, 48–49 (2001). But the recent development—and extraordinary cost—of
new therapeutics may be beginning to change this analysis: payers feel increasingly unable
to say “no” to even expensive genetic therapies, many of which are, after all, “cost
effective.” The sudden sharp spike in costs for many therapies also means that payers
cannot, in many instances, raise premiums in parallel. See Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r., FDA,
Remarks at the Leonard Davis Institute Symposium, Harnessing the Curative Potential of
Genomic Technologies (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/
ucm621964.htm [https://perma.cc/ST87-UFVJ].
276. Michael Chernew, David M. Cutler & Patricia Seliger Keenan, Increasing Health
Insurance Costs and the Decline in Insurance Coverage, 40 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1021, 1022,
1034 (2005).
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care rationing or severe strain on the public fisc—an even broader
cataclysm of injustice.277 This latter fear is substantial: given Medicaid’s
virtually mandatory coverage scheme, increased costs of even
significant, life-saving therapies may dramatically fray public
resources, forcing state Medicaid administrators to choose between
advocating for a specific health-care intervention rather than, say, fully
funding a year of kindergarten.278
To be fair, the vector pick-and-shovel play’s contribution to this
problem is the same as it is with patents, in general, for gene-editing
therapies. But incompletely disclosed vector patents, as in the pickand-shovel play, present some particular nuances to this calculus. First,
as necessary equipment to therapeutic gene-editing technology, vector
patents have the ability to raise prices on end products (gene-editing
therapies) even without disclosing which aspects of the technology they
are covering. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to parcel out
price assessments and figure out ways of saving money for gene
therapies.279 Second, this phenomenon of multiple patentees covering
a single product is likely to contribute to price increases in the form of
“royalty stacking,” a well-studied, albeit controversial, aspect of
product development.280 Assuming, without concluding, that royalty
277. See GRACE MARSDEN ET AL., INST. FOR CLINICAL & ECON. REVIEW, GENE
THERAPY: UNDERSTANDING THE SCIENCE, ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE, AND PAYING
FOR VALUE 7–8 (2017), https://icer-review.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/ICER-GeneTherapy-White-Paper-030317.pdf [https://perma.cc/JEA2-SX5M].
278. See id.; Symposium, The Cost of a Cure: Creating Sustainable Solutions for Gene
and Cell Therapies, University of Pennsylvania Leonard Davis Institute of Health
Economics (Sept. 28, 2018) (conference attended by JSS and held under Chatham House
rules).
279. That is, assuming that some vector technologies are substitutable prior to a given
therapy’s design, gene-therapy developers would have the opportunity to price shop or
negotiate among multiple, competing vector technologies—but only if there was
transparency regarding the relationship between the vector license price and the technology
implemented. Such transparency could be tied to disclosures of vector technologies in
patents. But as detailed in this Article, such transparency doesn’t readily exist.
280. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl A. Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2007) (defining “royalty stacking” as “situations in which a single
product potentially infringes on many patents, and thus may bear multiple royalty burdens
. . . reflect[ing] the fact that, from the perspective of the firm making the product in question,
all of the different claims for royalties must be added or ‘stacked’ together to determine the
total royalty burden borne by the product”). With this said, it is difficult to overstate how
controversial the concept of “royalty stacking” has been in the patent economics literature;
many well-regarded economists have disclaimed that such a phenomenon even exists. See,
e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief
for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92 MINN. L. REV. 714, 718–19
(2008) (recounting that royalty stacking did not occur in the development of various wireless
communications standards).
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stacking is a true risk for vector patents in gene-therapy products, the
pick-and-shovel play makes this harder to investigate even while it is
unclear which layers of the stack they apply to.281 Lastly, the increased
costs likely to come in the vector space bring with it the ethical issue of
price transparency to patients and practitioners.282 While all patented
therapeutics in the United States suffer from extreme price opacity,
vector-implementing gene therapies arguably make the practice worse
by adding an increased layer of technical opacity to an already dark
field of business practice.283 The vector pick-and-shovel play may not
be qualitatively different from patented drug pricing generally. But it
certainly does not improve things.
IV. PICKS, SHOVELS, AND PATENT DISCLOSURE
Gene editing, vectors, and patents seem to exist in a complicated
interrelationship of advanced therapies, platform technology,
disclosure, and secrecy. This may make it appear that the issues arising
from gene-editing vector patents are limited if not unique. But in fact
the case illuminates some broader issues about how patents work for
cutting-edge and unpredictable technologies. First, the ethical
problems centering on partial disclosure and secrecy suggest that there
are other benefits to patent disclosure other than merely technical
Perhaps the most serious criticism, however, comes from Einer Elhauge, who provides
both an empirical and a theoretical denial of royalty stacking as a common occurrence. See
generally Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically
Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535 (2008). Elhauge’s criticism
specifically takes the Lemley-Shapiro model to task for discounting the following “realistic
assumptions: (i) that firms negotiate a series of patents when they make a multi-component
product, (ii) that firms using the patents have information about their operations that patent
holders lack[,] or (iii) that demand is not constant.” Id. at 537. Notably, for the purposes of
vector patents and gene-editing developers, it appears that neither assumption (i) or (ii)
applies and that assumption (iii)—given the extraordinary untapped demand for geneediting therapies—may, in fact, cut the other way.
This is all to say: as controversial as royalty stacking is in the academic literature, the
specific circumstances surrounding the vector patent pick-and-shovel play suggests that it
may occur here. The degree to which it occurs and whether the ultimate prices for
therapeutics using patented vector technology are “excessive” remain to be seen. The
authors are neither clairvoyants nor economists; we don’t know.
281. See supra note 275 (regarding pricing and transparency).
282. See Narcyz Ghinea, Wendy Lipworth & Ian Kerridge, Propaganda or the Cost of
Innovation? Challenging the High Price of New Drugs, 352 BRIT. MED. J., no. i1284, Mar.
11, 2016, at 1, 2 (criticizing the link between high therapeutic costs and high development
costs given that development costs are not transparent); Fintan R. Steele, Big Pharma’s
Commedia, 123 CELL 971, 972 (2005) (noting therapeutic developers’ need for development
cost transparency given drug prices).
283. See supra Section II.B.
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ones—namely, that they serve as a form of consumer information.
Second, it serves as a potentially instructive case study of factors that
contribute to the cost of inventing around an operative but only
partially disclosed and patented technology. Lastly, it suggests that
poor disclosure in combination with commercialization may work as a
form of standards lock-in—a channeling of inventive efforts around
working with a widely adopted standard rather than developing better
ones. Besides simply allowing others to “make and use” the underlying
technology, the case of gene-editing vector patents may further teach
us that there are a number of ancillary benefits to patent disclosure.
This is not to say that patents are the sole culprit—or solution—to
better disclosure on the road to informed consent. Regulators like the
FDA play an enormous if not primary role in the quantity and quality
of information disclosed about manufacturing inputs like gene-editing
vectors for clinical trials.284 The FDA is, in many ways, an information
disclosure agency; “today drug regulation guides the development of
information that turns poisons, used advisedly, into drugs.”285 One can
therefore certainly imagine a regime where the FDA is both statutorily
authorized and administratively willing to mandate maximum
disclosure regarding inputs for therapeutic manufacture. But that is
purely imaginative. The FDA is both legally prohibited from requiring
the disclosure of confidential business information from clinical trials
and culturally unwilling to do so. This makes the role of disclosure for
patents, however strong (or weak), all that much more important.
A. Expanded Audiences for Patent Disclosure
Patents have been classically described as a quid pro quo: the
inventor receives exclusionary rights to the invention for the disclosure
to the public of how the invention actually works.286 Requiring such
disclosure allows the public to make use of the technology not just after
the patent expires but immediately once the patent application is
published by the USPTO.287 This allows others to test aspects of the
invention, to attempt to build work-arounds to the patent, and to create

284. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 380–84 (2007) (discussing FDA’s role in information
disclosure).
285. Id. at 347.
286. Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, supra note 31, at 865 n.128
(recounting the history of this phrase).
287. Eisenberg, supra note 35, at 1022; Seymore, supra note 35, at 624.
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improvements.288 According to Timothy R. Holbrook, “the public
benefits from the disclosure of the invention because the public
storehouse of knowledge is thus enhanced, allowing others to rely upon
the teachings of the patent to generate even further follow-on
innovation.”289
Despite these paeans to “the public,” the audience to which patent
disclosures are directed tends to be limited. Most generously, patents
are thought of as informing scientists and engineers in the technology’s
field.290 This is implied by the statute, which requires patents’
disclosures to inform “persons having ordinary skill in the art.”291 And
there is, in fact, some empirical evidence suggesting that researchers,
at least in some fields, “read” or are at least aware of patents.292 More
cynically, perhaps, disclosures only inform other patent professionals
of patents in the field so they can either invent around or have their
attorneys draft around them.293
But the pick-and-shovel case for gene-editing vectors suggests that
patent disclosures may be important for others—namely, consumers of
patented technology.294 The lack of disclosure surrounding geneediting vector patents, and the ethical issues this raises, teaches that
clinicians, doctors, and patients may benefit from more robust
disclosure paradigms, even if only indirectly. Better patent disclosure
allows these consumers to make better choices about whether, when,
288. Fromer, supra note 35, at 548–49; Seymore, supra note 35, at 624.
289. Holbrook, supra note 35, at 131.
290. See Anderson, supra note 36, at 1590 (“Disclosure has always been focused around
the PHOSITA: the person having ordinary skill in the art.”); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do
Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 550–54 (2012) (reviewing
the existence of this “generous” view in the literature).
291. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
292. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Who Reads Patents?, 35 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY
421, 421 (2017) (conducting, empirically, a survey assessment of scientists and engineers on
whether and to what extent they derive useful information from patents); Ouellette, supra
note 290, at 567–70 (surveying nanotechnology researchers).
293. Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV.
72, 73–75, 86–88 (2012).
294. Cf. Anderson, supra note 36, at 1575 (“[A] patent can inform innovators, investors,
and consumers about the value of an inventive idea.”); Devlin, supra note 36, at 425
(“[Disclosures of patented] inventions are presumably of some worth to third parties as well,
be they competitors, scientists, or consumers.”); Ghosh, supra note 36, at 337–38 (“[Patent]
disclosures for consumers can become more meaningful and provide guidance in how to
respond to identified disease proclivities and risk.”). To be clear, this refers to downstream,
nontechnical users of the technology; it is not meant to refer to technical users of the
patented technology stylized as consumers. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 35, at 599 (“[A]s
each patentee is also a consumer of innovation literature, he benefits from others’ better
patent disclosures in his own research and development.”).
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and how to use the patented technology. This is true even if consumers
do not read the patent themselves and the disclosed information is only
conveyed to them by others, like commercial users.295 In this way,
patent disclosure can operate as an object of consumer efficiency akin
to Clarisa Long’s model of patents as “signals,” giving consumers
enough information about the underlying product to make informed
choices about purchasing and use.296 This is analogous, perhaps, to the
operation of trademarks as minimizing consumers’ search function
with regard to quality, even if consumers know little about the guts of
the mark-holders’ manufacturing process.297 Far from the technical
notion of patent disclosure working simply to allow persons having
ordinary skill in the art to replicate—that is, “make and use”—the
technology, patent disclosure here informs consumers about the risks

295. See Anderson, supra note 36, at 1591 (“[T]here are numerous nonskilled audiences
that a patent can reach. The dissemination of important information to a consumer may not
allow the consumer to make the invention himself, but that is beside the point. The
consumer may need to know other information before deciding to purchase a patented
device: How much does the patented product cost? Does it work? Is it better than what
came before? Is it technologically innovative? Very little of the information needed to make
a purchasing decision will be contained in a patent. But the patent (even the very existence
of the patent) may encourage a consumer to purchase, even though that information is not
technical in nature.”).
For this reason, one of the more typical solutions to information asymmetries—vertical
integration—is unlikely to be effective. See Lee, supra note 159, at 1541–43 (discussing
vertical integration arising from information asymmetries). To the contrary, vertical
integration here is likely to exacerbate the problem of poor consumer disclosure. In such an
instance, a firm—no longer required to demonstrate the novelty or significance of its
technology to other businesses—could keep even more information secreted from
downstream purchasers.
296. See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 677 (2002) (“The social
benefit of patent signaling is the increase in market efficiency because of the existence of
more information about the firm. . . . Without patents to provide a window (however hazy)
into the firm, investors might carry out inefficient searches in pursuit of better information.
When the two types of inefficiencies are netted out, the firm’s informational advantage may
render excessive signaling by the firm preferable to excessive searches by investors.”).
297. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting
Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1225–27 (2007) (reviewing
literature and cases supporting the notion that trademark law seeks to encourage “efficient
resource allocation and bring consumers the highest quality products at the lowest prices”).
At the same time, the search-costs theory of trademark has come under sustained attack.
See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1840–41 (2007) (challenging the notion that diminished search costs
and “improving the quality of information in the marketplace” are normatively appropriate
moorings for trademark law). Whether search costs are indeed an appropriate touchstone
for granting trademarks is an issue beyond the scope of this Article. At the same time, it
may be interesting to think about the vector patent pick-and-shovel play as arising from an
analogous connection between patent signals, poor patent disclosure, and shoddy marks.
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and benefits of the technology they wish to use.298 Simply put, patent
disclosure may not only serve as a manual but also as a label.
B.

Informing the Costs of Inventing Around

Patent disclosure provides another benefit: it allows others to
“invent around” the patented technology.299 By providing information
about how the claimed technology actually works, users and
commercial developers can assess how to adapt the technology to avoid
infringement (and royalty payments).300 Far from being a nefarious
practice, this is a core function of peripheral claiming in patent law.301
At the same time, inventing around claimed technology may be
more costly than simply obtaining a license to the sought-after
technology.302 Patent disclosure, therefore, allows users to assess not
only how to invent around particular technology but also the cost of
doing so. There exists economics and patent law literature noting that
the costs of inventing around a particular claimed invention increase as
disclosure decays; it is hard to figure out how much it costs to get
around a patented technology if it is hard to figure out how the
technology works.303 But the inverse implication is likely true as well:
298. Cf. Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, supra note 31, at 899 (linking
irreproducible patent disclosure of drugs to issues concerning patient safety among others).
299. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
300. Dan L. Burk, Perverse Innovation, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 24 (2016). But see
Sichelman & Graham, supra note 37, at 135.
301. Burk, supra note 300, at 25 (“[F]ar from frustrating or eluding the intent of the
patent, inventing around may be viewed as furthering important goals of the patent
system.”).
302. See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION
61 (2007), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/antitrust-enforcementand-intellectual-property-rights-promoting-innovation-and-competition-report.s.departmentjustice-and-federal-trade-commission/p040101promotinginnovationandcompetitionrpt0704.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WE9A-XDFK] (noting the tensions between licensing and design-around
strategies); Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of
Innovation Policy, 34 J. CORP. L. 1259, 1262 (2009) (“Professor Hovenkamp has explained
that ‘too much [intellectual property] protection can produce costly monopolies or exclusive
rights that others must either license or innovate around.’ This increases the costs of market
entry and innovation, ultimately hurting both static and dynamic efficiency.” (alteration in
original) (quoting HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE
AND EXECUTION 249 (2005))); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patents and Growth: Empirical
Evidence from the States, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1490 (2009) (“[If] it is less expensive to
license than to invent around[,] . . . taking a license is individually rational.”).
303. See, e.g., Anokhin & Wincent, supra note 10, at 441 (“As long as the strength of the
patent protection regime is a known quantity—which is generally believed to be the case—
the prospective entrepreneur may assign probabilities to the likelihood of a counterattack
by the patent holder and/or estimate the chance of the endeavor[’s] success and take those
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robust patent disclosure improves cost assessments of inventing around
claimed technology.304
Yet in some cases, even robust patent disclosure is not enough to
induce users to invent around a particular technology—the relative
costs are simply too high. In the case of gene-editing vectors, costs are
high because there are other structural barriers to working around
patented products—namely, FDA regulation and the highly
experimental and uncertain nature of the technology itself.305 If a
commercial developer needs FDA approval to commercially use a
vector created in-house, and if the developer has to run costly and
highly uncertain experiments to obtain that approval, that may be
substantially more costly than simply obtaining a license to the
technology from a company like Spark Therapeutics. Couple this with
the fact that currently approved vectors actually “work” in the
regulatory sense of the phrase, and the relative cost of inventing
around becomes insurmountably high.306 Why spend money
reinventing the wheel?
What poor disclosure of gene-editing vector patents teaches is that
poor patent disclosure, in tandem with structural barriers to
commercial development, can operate to discourage others from
inventing around even a troublesome, patented, but otherwise useful
technology.307 Inventing and receiving approval for new vectors is
probabilities into account when considering whether or not to pursue the respective
opportunity.” (citation omitted)); Richard J. Gilbert, Patents, Sleeping Patents, and Entry
Deterrence, 17 J. REPRINTS ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 205, 247 (1987) (“The patent grant does
offer substantial protection when the cost of imitating the patented article is high. . . . In
many cases the patent disclosure is grossly inadequate to enable firms to copy new
technology.”); Seymore, supra note 35, at 654 n.172 (“[A] competitor can attempt to design
around the invention or find flaws in the disclosure to invalidate it.”).
304. This is, to be clear, an intuition. There is little, if any, literature the authors could
find assessing the merits of this argument. Empirical work—essentially, a survey asking
firms that read patents whether disclosure has helped or hindered design-around efforts—
would be helpful to assess whether this phenomenon exists in the real world.
305. NASEM, HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 29, at 103–07 (reviewing FDA
issues concerning gene editing); Shim et al., supra note 9, at 746 (cataloging FDA regulatory
hurdles); see also Anokhin & Wincent, supra note 10, at 440 (describing the difficulties in
becoming the first mover in highly regulated fields).
306. That is, inventing around may not be successful in the sense that the design-around
vector may affect the therapeutic end product in such a way as to fail FDA approval. In that
circumstance, the therapeutic developer is faced with bearing the cost of designing around
the patented vector, but with no marketable product to show for its efforts. Such costs are
almost certainly more than the cost of licensing a regulatorily “proven” technology.
307. See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, The Generic Biologics Debate: Industry’s Unintended
Admission that Biotech Patents Fail Enablement, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 21–24 (2006)
(describing this for biosimilars in the context of nonenablement).
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fraught and expensive.308 Whether this is enough to truly prevent those
wishing to invent around the patent remains to be seen—it is an
empirical question worthy of a separate investigation.309 Poor patent
disclosure, however, makes this assessment incredibly difficult. And
without better information about how much inventing around actually
costs, developers’ appetite for inventing around patented vectors is
likely to be diminished. The case with gene-editing vector patents
teaches that another virtue of patent disclosure—even when there are
commercial embodiments available—is a more accurate assessment of
how much it would cost to avoid them.
C.

Channeling Therapies and Platform Standardization

Generally, patent disclosure is an integral part of standard
setting—an industry’s agreement of common standards or components
for a broader, complex technology.310 For standard-setting
organizations—the collective, often ad-hoc entities that oversee the
standard-setting process—technical standards are adopted by users
and downstream developers en masse.311 Where certain developers own
smaller pieces of the standard set to be adopted, patents serve as one
instrument for each participant to disclose their particular contribution
to the standard.312 Because standards often prove sticky—it is difficult,
for example, to require hardware manufacturers to remove USB ports
from their wares after the USB standard has been adopted—patent
holders often commit to contributing their intellectual property
through fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory licensing.313
This well-worn process turns, however, on the robustness of
patents’ technical disclosure; with poor disclosure, it may be difficult,
if not impossible, to determine whether patents committed to a
standard actually practice it or not.314 This is a routine if not common
308. See, e.g., Ricki Lewis, What Should Gene Therapy Cost?, PLOS BLOGS (Oct. 26,
2017),
https://blogs.plos.org/dnascience/2017/10/26/what-should-gene-therapy-cost/
[https://perma.cc/964T-VAU4] (“Luxturna was in clinical trials for 9 years, and that’s
expensive. Developing the vector alone can cost $500,000 to $1 million.”).
309. See supra note 306.
310. Jorge L. Contreras, Essentiality and Standards-Essential Patents, in CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND
PATENTS 209, 209–10 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2017).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Contreras, Much Ado, supra note 38, at 2.
314. See, e.g., Anne Layne-Farrar, Moving Past the SEP RAND Obsession: Some
Thoughts on the Economic Implications of Unilateral Commitments and the Complexities of
Patent Licensing, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1093, 1102 n.31 (2014) (“[E]ven after a standard
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problem for electronics and software standards where more patents are
frequently tied up in standards than readily necessary.315 In those
industries, however, technical operability of the underlying technology
is rarely an issue; the role of standard-setting organizations is to ensure,
among other things, that users can practice standard technologies even
if the patents claimed to be covering them are indeterminate. But there
are no such standard-setting organizations, at least to date, for geneediting vectors. The gene-editing vector patent cases described here,
therefore, begin to clarify what happens when a certain component
technology becomes standard but only poorly discloses how it
operates. Poor disclosure means that a standard may be adopted that
is otherwise technically suboptimal, unsafe, or not universally
applicable.316
In addition, the gene-editing vector patents suggest that
standardization in the shadow of poor patent disclosure may result in
what we call “channeling”: the continued development of downstream
technology using a previously adopted standard simply because it’s
available.317 In the gene-editing patent context, this means the selection
of certain gene-editing therapies for development not because they
have the strongest health impact but because they work with off-theshelf vectors.318 This risks exacerbating some of the potential inequities
already brewing for gene therapy: that the therapies developed will
largely be directed to genetic disorders afflicting wealthy, developed
countries and sold for high prices.319 In other cases, there is the risk that
treatment for some diseases may lag behind because the underlying
vector technology—vectors’ picks and shovels—has not been robustly
investigated.

has been defined, it can be a subjective judgment as to whether a particular patent’s claims
match the technical specifications of a standard.”).
315. See, e.g., Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1323–24, 1326 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (concluding that tying standards operative patent licenses to licenses for patents
that did not practice a standard is not patent misuse).
316. A point of terminology is probably in order. In the context of standard-essential
patents, patent disclosure frequently refers to the act of standard-setting participants
disclosing which patents they own or license that they believe would be required by a
technical standard. This is not what we mean here. We mean patent disclosure in the classic
sense: the technical disclosure of information within a given patent.
317. Cf. Barnett, supra note 38, at 1865 (describing platform developers’ attempt to give
away expensively developed platforms, in order to encourage their adoption as a solution
to the “host’s dilemma”).
318. See supra text accompanying note 39.
319. Sherkow, Public Health, supra note 33, at 669.
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To be fair, in some instances channeling is less problematic. There
are few issues with channeling in the information technology space, and
indeed there are some instances in that industry where channeling has
actually produced resounding successes.320 But for gene editing and
other advanced therapies, channeling gives cause for concern.
Choosing diseases for therapeutic development has public health
concerns that extend beyond mere market efficiencies. Better patent
disclosure—knowing vectors’ manufacturing and applicability
details—would go a long way. The tail shouldn’t wag the dog.
CONCLUSION
If gene editing is a modern-day gold rush, there’s still a lot of
money to be made in picks and shovels—the vectors used to get gene
editors’ molecular equipment into cells. Companies like uniQure,
MaxCyte, and Spark Therapeutics are beginning to market vector
“platforms” to more high-profile gene-editing companies. And in
doing so, these vector companies have relied on both patents and
secrecy: patents covering their technologies that fail to entirely disclose
how they work. Just like the pick-and-shovel business during the 1848
Gold Rush, this is a form of informational arbitrage: if everyone knew
exactly how the patented vectors worked, they would develop their
own.
And yet, this strategy—good for oil and gas storage, bulk
chemicals, or cloud computing services—raises some difficult
bioethical issues when applied to experimental and potentially unsafe
therapies. It makes uncertain the risk of experimental therapies using
the vectors, lulling patients and clinical research subjects into a false
sense of security. This is exacerbated by the scant patent disclosures
made by vector developers that are often rooted in insufficient
preclinical evidence. Patient autonomy is also impeded because
secrecy, when combined with gene editing’s hype, makes true informed
consent difficult to obtain. And patents covering vectors, even when
only partially disclosed, are likely to contribute to the already
astronomical costs of gene therapies. Selling picks and shovels in a gold
rush may be good business strategy, but when the miners are the ill and
the desperate, it may simply be predation.
At the same time, the issues surrounding gene-editing vector
patents also serve as a case study for patent policymakers on why
320. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 38, at 1865 (describing channeling, at least in beneficial
contexts for “free” platforms, as resulting from the “host’s dilemma”).
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robust patent disclosure is important. Patent disclosure informs not just
users and technical developers of the technology but also consumers.
It also clues in downstream developers—like gene-editing
companies—on the costs of inventing around a technology, if needed.
And lastly, patent disclosure polices against uncharacterized
technologies becoming standardized—the “channeling” of future
development around nuts and bolts that are not well understood. Just
like the Gold Rush of 1848, more information about where to find good
picks and shovels checks against the hype then displayed by Sam
Brannan in that May in San Francisco:
“GOLD! GOLD! GOLD! From the American River!”321

321. Watson, supra note 13, at 301.

